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1INTRODUCTION
The present thesis deals with the application of European Community (EC)1
Competition Law by the competent Communitarian institutions, namely the Commission,
the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice. Because the discussion will
concern its application to non-European legal entities, one explanatory remark is
necessary. Dealing with the application of Competition Law with regard to non-European
corporations is not meant to suggest that any form of discrimination based on nationality
exists. As former Commissioner Sir Leon Britta commented with regard to one of the
early cases involving non-EC companies, “the location of a party’s incorporation or
headquarters is immaterial for Competition Law” ,2 which must focus on impact on
markets.
However, while Mr. Brittan’s argument can be said to hold true, it must also be
noted that EC law is no exception to one basic principle, that is the territorial nature of
the law. The law is the expression of one sovereign power which has territorially limited
extension and its application to entities or situations that have no territorial links to its
territory deserves special treatment.
                                                          
1 Nowadays the European Community has evolved into the European Union (EU). However, it should be
noted that according to the Treaty of M astricht, the Community is one of the three “pillars” that constitute
the Union. Article A of the Treaty reads as follows: “The Union shall be founded on the European
Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by this Treaty.” The
remaining two pillars are enucleated in articles J (Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy)
and K (Provisions on Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs). Since European Competition
Law entered the structure of the Union as part of the legislation of the Community, in the present thesis the
terms will be used  interchangeably.
2 Leon Brittan Competition Policy and the Merger Control in the Single European Market (1991), 6
(emphasis added).
2One necessary goal of this thesis then will be the assessment of the EC’s treatment
of these cases. A legal entity’s non-European nationality must not be confused with the
lack of links to the EC, as the presence of an established (not necessarily incorporated)
branch or subsidiary within the EC will suffice to determine the ordinary - that is
territorial -  application of EC law. Instead, the focus will be on cases that would require
extraterritorial application of the law: As it will be discussed, the Court of Justice has
never formally endorsed the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction,3 so that it will be
necessary to discover how the EC deals with cases that have no links that could trigger
the territoriality principle.
Another purpose of this thesis will be to search into the ramifications of the
transnational structure of certain corporations. In fact, while these may be affected by the
peculiarities of EC Competition Law, they may be able to affect a market in Europe
through their dominance of another market elsewhere. Based on the assumption that the
legal standards cannot and will not vary simply depending on the nationality of the
entities that are subject to the EC’s sovereignty, a case-oriented analysis will be made to
uncover the general orientations, if any, followed by the Communitarian institutions in
the application of Competition Law to non-EC firms.
Before analyzing these points, some understanding of the legal framework of EC
Competition Law will be provided, focusing on the powers of the Commission and the
peculiarity of its role (as connected with the peculiar goals of EC Competition Law).
Instead, only little analysis of the offences set forth by articles 85 - 86 and the merger
                                                          
3 See the argument of former Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan reported in Joseph P. Griffin
Extraterritoriality in U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Enforcement 67 Antitrust L.J. 159, 186-187. Also, see Leon
Brittan Competition Policy and the Merger Control in the Single European Market (1991), 2-3 “In my view
States may exercise jurisdiction in competition cases with a foreign element only to the extent permitted by
international law. […] This is more obviously true of the European Community, a creature of international
law and bound by its rules which has grown into an actor in its own ight on the world stage.” (emphasis
added).
3control regulation will be carried out, since doing so would divert the thesis from its
subject.
4CHAPTER I
EC COMPETITION LAW, SCOPE AND ENFORCEMENT
Introductory remarks
The foundations of EC Competition Law essentially consist of a very small
number of legislative provisions. Of the articles that constitute Title V, Chapter 1 of the
Treaty, only the first two, articles 85 and 86, set forth two of the three basic offenses of
EC Competition Law.4 Most noticeably, while in 1951 the Members included in article
66 of the European Coal and Steel Community a specific provision about concentrations,
the Treaty of Rome does not even contain a similar rule. Yet, the protection of
competition was included in the fundamental principles of the Community at article 3 (f)
of the Treaty. Because the Treaty can be paralleled to a State’s constitution, it is obvious
that all basic principles must be read so as to be in accord among themselves. To a big
extent, this explains certain orientations of the Commission and the Court of Justice,
whose policies in Competition Law enforcement may well seem odd to those who fail to
weigh the implications deriving from employing inter alia Competition Law for purposes
such as friendly relationships, social welfare, market integration and more.
By way of summary, it could be said that in a setting as that of an international
organization, that is an institution lacking original, sovereign powers and that is only
given enumerated attributions, it was left to the Court to assess the scope of the powers of
the Communitarian institutions and how they should be applied. Contrary to what might
                                                          
4 Pursuant to article 12 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in May 1999, articles 85, 86
and 87 have been re-numbered and are now articles 81, 82 and 83 respectively. Because they are still
commonly referred to by their previous numeration in all the current literature, the same approach  will be
followed in this thesis.
5usually be expected to happen in the case of a jurisdiction that had essentially civilian
roots, the Court of Justice arose to a law-making function and very often ended up
creating, rather than just interpreting, the law.5 Of course, this greatly contributed to the
formation of a very case-oriented body of rules, which is not necessarily always
consistent with the legal tradition of continental Europe.
In one of the early leading cases the Court had to address an issue that was
troublesome under two aspects. In fact, not only did it involve intellectual property -
trademarks - something which by its very nature clashes with antitrust in that it tends to
endorse monopolistic or restrictive behavior, but it also involved the scope of
Communitarian institutions as opposed to national authority. In Grundig6 in fact the
German manufacturer of electronic equipment and its exclusive French distributor -
Consten - brought appeal against a decision by the Commission claiming that it infringed
article 222 (which requires the EC to refrain from altering national property laws) and 36
(concerning industrial and commercial property as a permissible limitation to the
prohibition of quantitative restrictions) of the Treaty.
“Considering articles 36 and 222 [Grundig and Consten] appeared to have a
strong case. A court that would have seen its role as a scrupulous guardian of the
competence of the Member States would not have found it problematic to pass a
judgement in [their] favor. However, anxious [that the Members could use the provisions
of the Treaty limiting the liberalization of trade] as a means to weaken the competence of
the Community” the Court stated that such provisions should not be intended as to limit
                                                          
5 However, it should be noted that this does not mean that within the E.U. system the decisions of the Court
of Justice represent a binding precedent as it happens in the U.S. Even though the Commission and the
Court of First Instance keep the orientations of the highest judicial authority into consideration,
disagreements do arise. This is most important in the enforcement of Competition Law, because of the
broad powers and discretion of the Commission. See for instance Barry E. Hawk System Failure: Vertical
Restraints and EC Competition Law [1996] C. M. L. R. 973, 980-983 about the contrasting views of the
two institutions concerning one of the most debated issues - the law of vertical restraints.
6 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the European
Economic Community. [1966] E. C. R. 329, 339
6the application of article 85 and to permit an abusive use of rights granted by the single
Members in order to do away with effective enforcement of EC Competition Law.7
“Whereas in the U.S. the issue would have been a mere conflict between patent and
antitrust law, in the EU it was also one of community law (competition law) and national
law (patent law). The Court was eager to declare the superiority of competition law to
assure an unchallenged priority of Community law over possibly conflicting national
laws.”8
Under article 85 concerted anticompetitive practices are illegal if they “may affect
trade between Member States.”9 Indeed this condition is not only easily fulfilled in the
jurisprudence of the European Courts, but it is also represents one of the most
fundamental concerns for all Communitarian institutions. This has to do with one of the
peculiarities of EC Competition Law, that is market integration. Accordingly, allocation
of competence between Communitarian and national authorities is only one of the two
functions that the requisite in object serves.10 Whil  this part of the language of article 85
has certainly been interpreted in the sense of determining what triggers EC Competition
Law as opposed to national antitrust laws,11 it has also been used in order to give primary
relevance to market integration in he merits of decisions. Historically, this has been
                                                          
7 H. Thomas Hefti European Union Competition Law 18 Seton Hall Legis. J. 613, 637.
8 Id.
9 Article 85 § 1.
10 In this sense the condition is similar to that of the Sherman Act - “restraint of trade among the several
States”. There too, such condition determines whether a given offense should be the object of federal or
state action.
11 “The agreement must also be one which ‘may affect trade between Member States’. This provision […]
is directed to determining the field of application of the prohibition by laying down the condition that it
may be assumed that there is a possibility that the realization of a single market between member states
might be impeded . It is in fact to the extent that the agreement may affect trade between member states
that the interference with competition caused by that agreement is caught by the prohibitions in Community
law found in article 85, whilst in the converse case it escapes those prohibitions.”  Société Technique
Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1966] E.C.R. 235, 248 (emphasis added).
7particularly true in cases related to vertical economic relationships (see infra, under the
discussion of Grundig, Sandoz, Ford).
The issue can be better explained in connection with the second condition
contained in article 85 § 1: agreements must have as their “object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition”. Obviously, the first step must consist of
determining what amounts to a (potential) restriction of competition. “The Commission
decided that under Article 85(1) any restriction of the commercial freedom of one or
more of the parties to an agreement would amount to a restriction to competition. The
practical consequence of this substantive interpretation is that the Commission’s initial
finding has almost invariably been that agreements containing any restrictive element are
anticompetitive […] despite the recognition by the Commission that much conduct
caught by the broad sweep of the provision, as so interpreted, is in fact acceptable.”12
In the US, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that § 1 of the Sherman Act,
if interpreted in its literal sense would have brought about impractical consequences with
regard to the development of trade.13 Likewise, it has been affirmed that article 85
“cannot mean what  it says.”14 In the case of  EC Competition Law, especially because of
its peculiar goals, the Commission adopted such a strict approach in order to retain
control both over the development of market interpenetration and the evolution of  the
legal standards of Competition Law. Then, far from merely having  purposes of
                                                          
12 Mario Siragusa The Millennium Approaches: Rethinking Article 85 and the Problems and Challenges in
the Design and Enforcement of the EC Competition Rules 21 Fordham Int’l L. J. 650, 652.
13 The proponent of this interpretation was Justice White. After dissenting in the latest decisions that
reaffirmed the traditional, strict interpretation - see United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association 166
U.S. 290 - he finally led the majority of Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States 221 U.S. 1 (1911) to
affirm that only undue or unreasonable r straints should be prohibited. The rationale was that if literally
interpreted the Sherman Act would have effectively prevented the conclusion of virtually every agreement,
since agreements were intended to be restraints by definition. The new interpretation therefore superseded
the previous one, which had maintained that the Sherman Act was precisely meant to substitute the
standard of reasonableness of the English common law tradition - Mitchel v. Reynolds 24 Eng. Rep. 347
(1711) - with a stricter requirement.
14 Mario Siragusa supra note 12, note 8.
8allocating jurisdiction, the conditions set forth in article 85 provided the Commission
with a chance to carry out a scheme of industrial and economic policy. 15
Also, with specific regard to competition policies, article 87 provides for the
enactment of second degree legislation to give effect to the substantive provisions of
articles 85 and 86. Pursuant to it Communitarian institutions are empowered to set forth
comprehensive, detailed legislation. Paragraph 2 provides the authority to “ensure
compliance” with articles 85 and 86, lay down “detailed rules” for the application of
article 85 §3, “define the scope” of articles 85 and 86, “define the respective functions of
the Commission and the Court of Justice” in applying legislation enacted pursuant to
article 87 §2 and finally assess interaction with national legislation.
As it appears in the letter of article 87, Communitarian institutions received a very
broad mandate to enact and enforce Competition Law, which proved crucial in
subsequent developments. Starting from the first piece of legislation implementing
articles 85 and 86, regulation 17 of 1962,16 the Council has enacted several regulations,
some of which empowered the Commission to regulate in further detail EC Competition
Law. As a result, the Commission not only has competence to directly apply the law -
indeed, it is exclusively competent in the case of certain provisions17 - but it also has
(regulatory) legislative capacity in the areas covered by the legislation enacted by the
Council by means of its own regulations. This is particularly important because, since the
enactment of regulation 17/62 (which empowered the Commission to issue exemptions
under article 85 §3)  the Commission has frequently used its regulatory attributions to
provide detailed discipline in the field of exemptions.
                                                          
15 Id., at 655. The author emphasizes that with the exception of France and Germany the Member States
simply did not have a body of rules concerning competition. It then took time before the remaining
Member States adopted national legislation and developed all the necessary interpretive and enforcement
tools. By way of example, Italy only enacted national antirust legislation in 1990.
16 1962 O.J. 204. Hereinafter regulation 17/62.
17 Most noticeably, regulation 17/62 affords the Commission the exclusive competence to deal with the
discipline of exemptions of paragraph 3 of article 85. See Article 9 of regulation 17/62.
9For instance, this happened for three major pieces of legislation such as regulation
19 of 1965,18 2821 of 1971,19 and 1534 of 1991.20 Pursuant to these Council regulations
the Commission in fact enacted a number of more detailed regulations such as those
about exclusive distribution agreements, research and development, franchising, know-
how licensing and insurance agreements.21
Powers of the Commission and judicial review. Basic procedure. Scope of
application
Comparatively, the Commission’s role could be paralleled to that of the Federal
Trade Commission in the United States. In fact, even though it is left to the Tribunal of
First Instance (and, in case of appeal, to the Court of Justice) to perform the
Community’s judicial function, the Commission’s enforcement competence goes so far
as to allow it to investigate, perform inspections and finally issue decisions with regard to
proceedings against private subjects. Such powers of enforcement, added to the power to
regulate mentioned in the previous paragraph and issue individual decisions contribute to
characterize the Commission as an institution that - at least to some extent - has been
attributed all three basic functions of legal systems.22
                                                          
18 Regulation 19/65, O.J.
19 Regulation 2821/71, O.J.
20 Regulation 1534/91, O.J.
21 These are respectively regulation n. 83 of 1983, n. 418 of 1985, n. 4087 of 1988, n. 556 of 1989 and n.
3932 of 1992. Also, article 87 represented the legal basis for the Council to enact the merger control
regulation n. 4064 of 1989, which will be analyzed later in this chapter.
22It has been commented that the only real limit on the Commission is the lack of human resources,
whereas it would be difficult to conceive a broader attribution of powers. Per Jebsen and Robert Stevens
supra, note , 447.
10
The powers of the Commission are noteworthy if considered in the light of the
degree of integration that the then six Members had reached by the time regulation 17/62
was enacted.23 In extreme synthesis, they range from that of investigating and requesting
information to that of issuing fully enforceable decisions.24 Art cles 11-14 of the
regulation deal with the acquisition of all information that is necessary to the
implementation of substantive Competition Law. Such information may regard single
undertakings or entire sectors of the economy (even though these general inquiries
inevitably involve individual investigations on their turn). Whenever market parameters
such as scarce price flexibility suggest conditions of distorted competition the
Commission may start a general inquiry, which as a practical matter will be implemented
by requiring undertakings or associations of undertakings to supply information.25 The
addressee of a request “shallsupply the information requested”; if not, the Commission
will issue a decision setting forth time limits for compliance and the penalties for
noncompliance.26 Also, article 15 of the regulation provides for the power to impose fines
for incomplete or misleading information.
With respect to the execution of the investigations articles 13 and 14 distinguish
between those carried out by the authorities of the Member States upon request of the
Commission - not very frequent - and those that the Commission will carry out itself after
informing the authorities of the State. With specific regard to the application of EC
                                                          
23 Even though an analysis of the historical evolution of the Community would not be directly relevant to
the immediate purpose of this thesis, it should be noted for a better understanding that the 1960s -
especially until the 1966 Compromise of Luxembourg - featured strong oppositions (especially from the
French Presidency) to enhancing the Community to a properly supranational entity. While the most violent
criticism regarded the issue of integration as such and the use of less than unanimous majorities within the
Council rather than competition policies in particular, the contrast with the attribution of powers similar to
those of a sovereign to the Commission is striking.
24 See James S. Venit EU Competition Law - Enforcement and Compliance Overview  65 Ant trust L.J. 81,
86-87.
25 Regulation 17/62 article 12 §§ 1-3.
26 Regulation 17/62 article 11 §§ 4-5.
11
Competition Law to non-EC firms, nothing prevents the Commission from conducting
such investigations, provided that a seat or an establishment of some kind is present
within the territory of one of the Member States. In  case no such establishment exists,
the Commission apparently will need to request the cooperation of foreign authorities,
which in the case of EC-United States relations is currently granted to some extent by a
bilateral agreement signed in 1991 and improved in 1998 (see infra, chapt r II). The
situation is conceptually similar to that of a refusal to grant entry to the Commission’s
inspectors: since the Commission’s powers fall short of coercive authority to enter the
premises of an undertaking, it will need to request the cooperation of national
enforcement bodies, which are bound by the duty of cooperation.27 Of course, the degree
of cooperation that the authorities of the Member States must guarantee is higher than
that of US antitrust agencies.
To summarize, in order to fully appreciate the scope of provisions granting the
Commission the power to “obtain all necessary information”28, “undertake all necessary
investigations” in connection with the implementation of competition policies29 and, as
mentioned, to intervene by requesting information from “undertakings whose size
suggests that they occupy a dominant position”30 the context of the EC should not be
neglected. Communitarian institutions have been granted broad powers and have often
stretched the limits of their attributions in pursuit of integration.31 I  the specific case of
Competition Law even efficiency - which is by most recognized as the basic goal of
                                                          
27 See Regulation 17/62 article 14 § 6 and James S. Venit supra note 24,  98-101.
28 Regulation 17/62 article 11 § 1.
29 Regulation 17/62 article 14 § 1.
30 Regulation 17/62 article 12 § 3.
31 See Thomas Hefti, supra, note 7. While the cited Grundig case concerning the conflict between national
patent law and Communitarian Competition Law is explanatory, the relations between the EC and the
Member States and the direct applicability of EC legislation (especially in the case of directives) is the
ground on which the Court of Justice traditionally emphasized to a greater extent the powers of the
institutions.
12
antitrust - has been afforded lesser attention, especially where clashes with integration
were possible. “Despite the contention of many scholars that efficiency is the emerging
goal of E.U. Competition Law, it is beyond doubt that E.U. officials view European
market integration […] as its most important objective, if not its raison d’ê re.”32
While in the US enforcement is often ensured by direct private antitrust action,
within the EC, Commission investigations may be either triggered by a letter of
complaint from a third party (most commonly a competitor of the suspect undertaking,
which may also greatly contribute in terms of information-gathering).33 The interested
complainant will typically remain a third party in the sense that if the Commission in its
discretion prosecutes the infringement it will do so in first person and the violation will
be prosecuted directly by it.
Following to the proceedings, the Commission has the power to issue enforceable
decisions terminating infringements and imposing fines. The substantial amount (up to
10% of the firm’s turnover) of such fines is meant to represent a deterrent for violations
(as treble damages are in US antitrust enforcement). However punitive fines can be, like
the entire proceeding they remain administrative in nature, with no criminal
consequences whatsoever.34 This distinguishes antitrust enforcement within the EC and
the US, as (whatever the actual deterrent of the criminal sanctions of  the Sherman Act)
criminal prosecution against foreign corporations for entirely foreign conduct is
                                                          
32 Emmanuel P. Mastromanolis Insights from U.S. Antitrust Law on Exclusive and Restricted Territorial
Distribution: the Creation of a New Legal Standard for European Union Competition Law 15 U. Pa. J. Int’l
Bus. L. 559, 562.
33 Regulation 17/62 article 3 § 2. See also article 6 of regulation 99 of 1963 setting forth the right of an
interested complainant to be heard before the Commission. However, third parties are never entitled to the
issuance of a particular decision (or a fortiori to a decision that be favorable to them)
34 See James S. Venit supra note 24, 103-104. Article 15 of regulation 17/62 sets forth the principles and
the criteria that the Commission must follow in determining the amount. Section 4 expressly excludes the
criminal nature of the fines.
13
becoming an increasingly crucial element of the Department of Justice’s strategy.35 Yet,
it should be noted that the Commission can fine European firms doing business with non-
EC firms that do not have assets within the Community.
In case at the end of the proceeding the Commission finds that one or more
undertakings have in fact violated Competition Law and issues a decision against them,
such decision is subject to proper judicial review like every other act of the Commission.
Today such review will typically start with an appeal before the Court of First Instance
and may eventually reach the Court of Justice (when the controversy regards the
interpretation or the application of the law).36
As for the scope of application of EC Competition Law is concerned, the language
of articles 85-86 and of regulation 4064/89 refers to private subjects. “The Treaty uses
the term ‘undertakings to designate the entities that are subject to EU Competition
Law.”37 These are essentially undertakings, that is  “any collection of resources to carry
out economic activities.”38 No mention is made about the nationality or place of
incorporation of the undertakings. According to an early definition, “an undertaking is
constituted by a single organization of personal, tangible and intangible elements,
                                                          
35 See Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations issued in April 1995 by the
Department of Justice. Criminal prosecution will only be sought in actions brought by governmental
agencies regarding hard core violation such ad naked restraints or bid rigging. The first case that involved
criminal sanctions to non-U.S. corporate officials for entirely foreign conduct was United States v. Nippon
Paper Industries Co. 103 F.3d 1 (1st Cir 1997).
36 James S. Venit supra note 24, 87. The procedure is the traditional appeal under article 173, whose
procedure now has to keep into account the competence afforded to the Court of First Instance by Council
decision 591 of 1988, which introduced the Tribunal. A thorough analysis of the procedural framework of
the proceedings from the beginning of the procedure to the decision of the Court of Justice is unnecessary
for the purposes of this thesis. The most widely recognized treatise about the procedure of EC Competition
Law is Christopher S. Kerse E.C. Antitrust Procedure (4th ed. 1998). Since regulation 17/62 is the basic
piece of legislation setting forth the powers of the Commission, what matters here is a basic clarification of
what kind of attributions the Commission was granted, what kind of approach it will follow in the light of
the peculiarity of the EC as opposed to a unitary Country and how it initiates the procedure.
37 Thomas Hefti supra, note 7, 620.
38 Valentine Korah An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice , 42 (6th ed. 1997).
14
attached to an autonomous legal entity and pursuing a given long term economic aim.”39
As it appears, such definition is liable to be adapted to a number of economic entities40
and to all three offenses of EC Competition Law.41 While the concept of undertaking is
seemingly plain, or at least flexible enough to be easily adapted to the circumstances of
any given case, determining whether legally separate undertakings form a single
economic entity may be crucial in determining the field of application of EC Competition
Law. The Economic Unit Theory in fact deals with the factual and economic reality of
large or composite industrial groups42 featuring a number of distinct corporations that are
related in terms of ownership and control (as well as productive functions).
                                                          
39 Klöckner-Werke AG and Hoesch AG v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community.
1962 E.C.R. 325, 341.
40 See Thomas Hefti supra, note 7, 620: “Because the Treaty does not define the term [undertaking], its
interpretation was left to the Commission, and eventually to the Court. They did not intend to adopt a
narrow meaning; an undertaking may be any natural or legal person, or any sort of entity, that carries out
some economic or commercial activity”.
41  “Undertaking is a broad concept, which seems to have the same meaning in articles 85, 86 and
90.”Valentine Korah, supra, note 38, 42.
42 One necessary remark:. Competition Law is not directed to undertakings alone. Despite the focus of this
thesis is (its application to private concerns), it should be clear that all entities (trade associations, States)
are subjected to it The issue was specifically addressed in the Wood Pulp case with regard to KEA, the
American trade association that participated in the international cartel. See infra, chapter II.
15
CHAPTER II
EXTRATERRITORIALITY, CONFLICTS AND  COOPERATION
“Extraterritoriality pertains to the operation of laws upon persons,
rights, or jural relations, existing beyond the limits of the enacting state or
nation, but still amenable to its laws.  The problem of extraterritorial
jurisdiction arises when nations advance conflicting claims in an attempt
to apply their own policies and laws to regulate extraterritorial conduct in
a way which may undermine and conflict with the laws and policies of a
foreign Government.”43
The issue in determining the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction to transnational
corporations derives from the simultaneous applicability of the nationality principle -
which acknowledges a Country’s power to regulate firms incorporated within its territory
- and the territorial principle - which acknowledges a Country’s power to regulate the
activity of subjects that are present and, in the specific issue at hand, do business on its
territory.
However, because Competition Law deals with the regulation of a given market,
its intrinsically territorial nature should be recognized in spite of the attempt of certain
authorities to regulate economic behavior abroad. A notorious example in the US is the
Webb-Pomerene Act:44 Essentially it consists of an exemption from the application of US
antitrust legislation to export cartels. In practical terms, those agreements between
competitors that would be considered as anticompetitive internally and would fall within
the scope of the Sherman Act are permitted upon notification to the competent authorities
                                                          
43 Allison J. Himelfarb The International Language of Convergence: Reviving Antitrust Dialogue Between
the United States and the European Union with a Uniform Understanding of “Extraterritoriality” 17 U. Pa.
J. Int’l Econ. L. 909, 913.
44  15 U.S.C.A. §§ 61-66.
16
in the light of the advantages that are expected to derive to US firms doing business
abroad (and consequently to US economy generally).
While the act positively encourages anticompetitive activities as long as their
negative effects only concern foreign markets, authorities that are responsible to ensure
competitive conditions in those markets cannot reasonably be expected to refrain from
intervening merely because those anticompetitive acts are permitted or even encouraged
under the firms’ national law.45
Even though the jurisdictional scope of the Treaty of Rome (unlike that of the
Sherman Act) is prima facie limited in that it only mentions competition and trade within
the Community without explicitly mentioning third Countries at all, such scope needs to
be redefined when a foreign element (such as the conclusion of an anticompetitive
agreement outside the EU by non-EU parties) is added.
Jurisdictional aspects of the Economic Unit Theory
In Dyestuffs,46 a major case involving EC and non-EC firms, exerting jurisdiction
over extracommunitarian firms was a central issue, since before the Court of Justice the
British and Swiss defendants argued that they were not subject to EC jurisdiction. Under
similar circumstances the proposition of adopting a theory of jurisdiction based on the
effects that stemmed from the defendants’ conduct (as the Court of Justice had arguably
hinted in the language of a previous case) would have played a decisive role in deciding
the case.
                                                          
45 Leon Brittan Competition Policy and the Merger Control in the Single European Market (1991), 4.
46 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v Commission of the European Communities. [1972]  E. C. R. 6 .
17
That was the kind of approach that both the Commission and the Advocate
General suggested that the Court openly adopted, as it was indicated that the language of
the Treaty “indisputably gives as the solecriteria the anticompetitive effects […] without
taking into account either nationality or the locality of the headquarters of the
undertakings”.47
Whatever the reasons for not accepting the argument without expressly rejecting
the underlying doctrine at the same time,48 the Court devised a solution that at one time
confirmed the assertion of jurisdiction and formally avoided to contravene a generally
accepted principle of international public law - territoriality.
First, the Court recognized the need to identify some effects on competition in
order for prescriptive jurisdiction to exist, thus satisfying the Treaty’s effect
requirement.49 Second, it held that “by making use of its power to control its subsidiaries
established in the Community” it was indeed the applicant that “was able to ensure that
its decision was implemented on that market.”50 Third, it established the legal premise
that “the fact that a subsidiary has separate legal personality is not sufficient to exclude
the possibility of imputing its conduct to the parent company.”51 In esse ce, while the
recognition of the effects was found to fulfil the requirements set forth in articles 85 and
86, it actually fell short of determining the extracommunitarian defendants’
responsibilities by itself (which would be tantamount to apply the effects doctrine).
                                                          
47  James F. Friedberg The Convergence of Law in an Era of Political Integration: The Wood Pulp Case
and the Alcoa Effects Doctrine 52 U.Pitt. L. Rev. 289, 312 (emphasis added).
48 Several scholars suggest that the Court of Justice simply wished to keep both doors open in the light of
the effectiveness of the effects doctrine on one hand and the widespread criticism on the other. Id., 312.
49 Dyestuffs, §§ 126-128.
50 Id., § 130.
51 Id., § 132.
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While the Economic Unity Theory favors defendants in that it can exempt from
liability in the merits the conduct of two or more undertakings belonging to the same
group (see supra, chapter I), as proposed by the Court it also proved to be a means to
essentially pierce the corporate veil.52 In fact because the Court reasoned that “the actions
of the subsidiaries may in certain circumstances be attributed to the parent company”, 53
it appears that what follows is that the Commission is enabled to fine corporations that
otherwise would be out of its reach. The implementation of the doctrine “widens the
circle of undertakings subject to jurisdiction of EC Competition Law by overcoming[as
opposed to resolving] extra-territorial and other jurisdictional problems.”54 By finding
conduct actually occurred abroad to have legally occurred within the EC (through a
subsidiary) the Court felt that it could implement competition policies while avoiding the
“knotty question” of extraterritoriality.55
Even though the involved Swiss and British corporations were not registered
anywhere in the EC in first person, they did have wholly owned subsidiaries within it. By
simply combining the legal premise mentioned above with the factual statement that the
parent companies, because they “held all or at any rate the majority of the shares”, were
“able to exercise decisive influence over the policy of the subsidiaries as regards selling
prices”,56 the Court opted to ignore further considerations of jurisdiction.
Apart from all possible criticism about the opportunity arising out of the decision
of piercing the corporate veil instead of providing a possibly more adequate doctrine for
                                                          
52 […] In particular where the subsidiary […] does not decide independently upon its own conduct on the
market, but carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by the parent company.” Id., §§
132-133.
53 Id., § 135.
54 Eran Aharon Lev European Community Competition Law: Is the Corporate Veil Lifted Too Often? 2 J.
Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 199, 205 (emphasis added).
55 Friedberg supra, note 49, 309.
56 Dyestuffs,  §§ 136-137.
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cases involving extracommunitarian elements, one of the issues that need to be dealt with
is the one regarding the definition of control over the subsidiaries. While in Dy tuffs and
Continental Can57 the Court applied the Economic Unit Theory in order to impute the
conduct of a wholly-owned subsidiary to its parent, it did so on a different basis in Zoja,58
where Commercial Solvents Corporation, the U.S. parent, owned a 51% majority of the
shares of the subsidiary Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano.
In the firs of these two subsequent cases, Continental Can, a New York
corporation had allegedly infringed article 86 by causing its Delaware subsidiary
Europemballage (which was also registered in Belgium) to buy out its sole competitor in
the relevant market. Continental Can’s argument ran that generally accepted principles of
international law exempted it from EC jurisdiction and that it was Europemb llage, a
distinct corporation having separate legal personality, that had accomplished the
takeover. Reasoning a contrario the Court of Justice responded that autonomous legal
personality provides shelter from liability for a subsidiary’s conduct to the benefit of a
parent company only when the subsidiary determines its market behavior autonomously,
while legal personality alone should be considered as a sham.59
Continental Can’s contested conduct consisted of “causing” Europemballage to
bid for the target company, that is, it operated such an influence on the functioning and
decision-making process of Europemballage that the latter could not be considered an
autonomous entity. Continental Can’s control was also exerted by making the necessary
financial means available, which in the Court’s holding made the parent “foremost”
responsible.60
                                                          
57 Europemballage Corp. v. Commission [1973] E. C. R. 215
58 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. v. Commission [1974] E. C. R. 223.
59 Continental Can,  § 15 (emphasis added).
60 Europemballage, § 16.
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Likewise, because the complaint in Zoja concerned conduct that in the merits
would amount to a violation article 86 only if carried out by a dominant firm,
Commercial Solvents Corporation (the absolute monopolist of the world market of a
particular chemical), claimed that it did not form an economic unit with its controlled
company in Italy (whose share of the market instead made its conduct negligible in terms
of abuse of dominant position). The mentioned twofold importance of the Economic Unit
Theory is apparent in that it provided the Commission and the Court with both a means to
exert jurisdiction over a firm which was not registered nor did business within the
Community and to determine the application of article 86 in the merits.
Before the Court of Justice the Commission maintained that, apart from holding a
majority of Istituto’s shares, Commercial Solvents had positively issued directives to its
subsidiary and that it effectively prohibited it to sell the chemical to third parties.61 This
was contrary to Istituto’s own interest, but perfectly fitting those of Commercial Solvents.
Not only did the Court accept this part of the Commission’s reasoning, but it also
supported the inference that the functional link between parent and subsidiary was
decisive in determining the application of the Economic Unit Theory and therefore the
direct involvement of Commercial Solvents Corp.62 It followed that a series of combined
business policies and strategies, coupled with Commercial Solvents’ control over Istituto
Chemioterapico determined that the two were found to be  jointly and severally liable.63
Because this entire line of cases is based on the belonging to a given group and on
notions of agency law (the subsidiary of course being the agent of the parent), the
                                                          
61 Zoja, § 37.
62 “[T]he coincidence [that] when csc decided to prolong its production to a stage beyond finishing and
Istituto, a former distributor of nitr propane aminobutanol, began its activities as a producer of ethambutol
is highly significant. It is difficult not to associate the decision by CSC no longer to sell nitr propane and
aminobutanol with the fact it made an exception in favour of Istituto, which was supplied with
dextroaminobutanol for the purposes of its own production of ethambut l”. Zoja, § 39.
63 Zoja, § 40.
21
underlying relation between the two entities is central to the issue. More specifically, this
relation is related to the notion of a parent’s control over its subsidiary as it is determined
by the principles of corporate law. As mentioned, in all cases the parent held more than
50% if not all of the shares of the subsidiary. The major possible downfall presented by
the approach based on capital and ownership alone is the possible occurrence of
inequities to the detriment of the entities that are subject to proceedings, and the
limitation incurred by the Commission. If strictly applied, the approach does not allow
the Commission and the Court to hold a firm that exerts a decisive influence without
actually possessing a majority of the voting shares accountable.
As it appears, this can well be the case whenever several otherwise unrelated
entities or stockholders own the bulk of the shares of a controlled company. Also, should
the fining policy continue to be inconsistent (in Zoja, but not in Dyestuffs both the parent
and the subsidiary were fined), minority stockholders would be penalized on account of
the violations perpetrated by the controlling stockholders which use the subsidiary in
order to procure an advantage to themselves rather than to the subsidiary.
In order to overcome this difficulty, the Court also applied a second test, which
aims at providing a basis for liability that is founded on the assessment of the control
actually exerted in the matter of the contested practice (or generally on a day-to-day
basis). The option of resorting to the test based on the exam of the functioning of the
company is apparent in the parts of the language of  the discussed judgements that deal
with the inferred relations between conduct and the communality of interests between
parents and subsidiaries. That was the case in the combined business patterns of
Commercial Solvents and Istituto Chemioterapico.
Specifically, the conclusions of the Commission, which the Court agreed on, were
based on annual reports showing Istituto Chemioterapico as one of Commercial Solvents’
subsidiaries. “It is inferred from the prohibition issued in 1970 by CSC to its distributors
on reselling nitropropane and aminobutanol for the manufacture of ethambutol that CSC
22
was not abstaining from exercising its power of control over Isti uto.” This, together with
an attempted takeover of its competitor, the complainant Zoja, “in which it is unlikely
that CSC played no part” and Istituto’s purchases of raw materials still available on the
market in response to Commercial Solvents’ decision to commercialize the finished
product was enough to support a finding of functional dependence.64 Such r asoning is
essentially analogous to that of Continental Can d Dyestuffs, where the Court had
emphasized the role of the parent in the decision-making process in financing the
contested practices.65
By combining the structural with the functional test the Court of Justice aimed at
providing a more reliable and  acceptable tool for similar cases. However, it has been
pointed out that while the coexistence of the two tests is beneficial to a principled
application of the Economic Unit Theory, the fact that after Zoja the Court had applied it
routinely, without explicitly addressing the requisites and the modalities of application
raises more than a doubt about the minimum stock ownership requirements. In particular,
what is unclear is whether the importance of the second prong, based on the
determination of the actual control, will be extended to the point of invalidating the
ownership of the majority of the stock as an unavoidable requirement.66 If not, it would
follow that the Commission can reach a parent company anywhere in the World provided
that it can bear the burden of proving actual control in spite of its position of a minority
shareholder.
Obviously, extending the role of the functional test would emphasize the role of
the determination of actual control as it is practically exerted in the day-to-day
                                                          
64 Zoja, §§ 37-41.
65 See James F. riedberg, supra note 49, 314. The author underscores the importance of Z ja be ause the
Court of Justice disregarded the fact that Istituto Chemioterapico and Commercial Solvents acted
independently in most matters but the relationship with Zoja, “and could therefore be considered an
economic unit for purposes of this litigation.”
66 Eran Aharon Lev, supra note 56, 210-211 and 229-230.
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functioning of a given business. Theoretically, control could be simply presumed
whenever the parent owns a majority or the totality of the stock. As a consequence, the
majority stockholder should prove that it cannot control the subsidiary in spite of its
position, which clearly appears to be a heavy burden. Essentially, because of the
difficulty of rebutting such a presumption, the emphasis would shift back on the structure
of the ownership (and all the related problems discussed above).
Alternatively, control could be the object of a specific test. In itself this solution
appears more acceptable than a quasi irreb ttable assumption. However, because in the
examined cases the Court has showed that it will accept circumstantialevidence in a
case-by-case assessment of the necessary degree of control, the question remains of how
circumstantial, how indirect such evidence can be for the C mmunitarian institutions to
be able to attribute a subsidiary’s conduct to its parents.
Even though subsequent cases seem to indicate a more cautious approach it is
here suggested that the Commission will not hesitate to use circumstantial evidence
whenever necessary. The Commission has shown to the present day that in pursuit of
competition policy objectives it will not adopt a “self-refrain approach” in the name of
formally irreprehensible legal standards. This consideration could also be coupled with
the inclination that the Communitarian authorities have shown to considering world-wide
economic groups or world-wide industry in a given sector with a “global” approach.
When faced with transnational companies whose conduct within the Union is
somehow influenced by the connection with their activities elsewhere in the world, the
Commission has not declined to weigh their functional or structural links in order to
reach its conclusions. In this, it has often been supported by the Court of Justice.
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Extraterritoriality, effects and implementation
a) The Effects Doctrine
Because the theory discussed above was specifically designed to avoid the
recourse to the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction, it presents a built-in limitation that
cannot always be avoided. Stretching the essence of the doctrine to the point of accepting
very weak evidence of actual control over the subsidiary cannot be a viable remedy under
all possible circumstances. One obvious limitation is represented by an infringement of
Competition Law by a firm which is not present at all as such in the territory of any
Member State.67For instance, were an European firm to collude with a non-European one
which lacks any direct contact within any Member State, should only the first be held
accountable?
Likewise, what would the solution be if none of the colluding firms were
European? What if the structural or functional links examined above indicated
independent action on the part of their European establishments (generically intended as
their business partners or counterparts and not as subsidiaries)? A case decided shortly
before Dyestuffs  had suggested that the Court of Justice might have indirectly endorsed a
different approach.
Since, as noted, neither article 85 nor 86 expressly refers to jurisdictional limits, it
could be argued that such lack of definition - coupled with the language referring to
practices having as object or result the distortion of competition - indicates an approach
that is merely based on anticompetitive effects on markets and trade. This represents the
basic tenet of the so called effects doctrine, set forth by Judge Learned Hand in the
                                                          
67 This line of criticism is the most frequently expressed by most commentators, who seem to believe that
Dyestuffs represented a lost occasion for resolving the issue. See Roger P. Alford Th  Extraterritorial
Application of Antitrust Laws: The United States and The European Community Approach 33 Va. J. Int’l L.
1, 31.
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landmark case Alcoa. 68 Even though the decision is too notorious, lengthy and complex
to be discussed here, few points should be highlighted. In fact, while the Court of Justice
never nominally endorsed the doctrine, the effects doctrine and the Alcoa  c se w re
discussed several times before the Court.
First, Alcoa came to reverse the traditional approach based on the principles of
nationality and territoriality on account of the internationalization of world trade, which
was then taking place on a larger scale than never before.69 Since part of the decision
focused on the transnational nature of some transactions and business practices, Judge
Hand’s decision somehow anticipated the reasoning that would be frequently found in the
decisions of US and European Courts in the years to come.
In Judge Hand’s opinion the passage from local to international trade clearly
showed how inadequate the traditional approach was - at least as it was expressed in
cases such as American Banana. Therefore, there was a compelling need of a solution
that could properly weigh agreements intended to affect international trade (namely the
imports to the US) whose implementation was shown to have had actual effects upon it.
In such cases, it would make no difference whether the agreement had been
partially performed within the US, since a corporation’s agents are its “animate means”.70
The essence of the doctrine is that circumstances such as the place where an agreement
was put into being or the nationality of the parties -formerly crucial in international cases
- became merely formal, almost irrelevant details if that agreement was later found to
produce negative effects on the competitive conditions of US markets. Under Alcoa, an
agreement that would be unlawful were it reached within the US would be qually
                                                          
68 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 442 (2nd Cir. 1945).
69 Prior to Alcoa, the statement of the law was represented by decisions such as American B nana, where
the Supreme Court found it “surprising to hear it argued that [actions by the plaintiff resulting in a
conspiracy and done outside the jurisdiction of the United States] were governed by the act of Congress”.
American Banana v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355 (1909).
70 Id., at 444.
26
unlawful if intended to affect imports to it, regardless of the legality and validity of the
agreement under the law of the Country that had territorial jurisdiction over the
agreement.
In order to fully realize the scope of the change that Alcoa ended with bringing
about, one must combine the theoretical foundations of the doctrine with its actual
implementation. Hypothetically, in fact, the Al oa court and all the others thereafter
could have required that the effects necessary to essentially substitute the jurisdiction of
the US to that of the Country that would be competent under the traditional principles
were of a particular magnitude or blatantly exploitative of the lack of sovereignty of the
US. In that case, the new doctrine would have been essentially a means to do away with
the privileges and subterfuges that derived from a rigid application of the principles of
international law.71
Focusing on the determination of the kinds of effects, their magnitude, the types
of conduct and the link between the conduct and the effects, Judge Hand’s opinion was
quite strict in that it looked beyond ‘numerical’ effects. In spite of the overall increase in
the imports to the US, he held that “there is reason to suppose that [the defendants]
expected that [the depressant they had applied to the market] would have some effect,
which it could have only by lessening what would have otherwise been imported.”72
Leaving the merits of the decision aside, it remains that from the beginning the effects
doctrine has been regarded as a powerful- if not intrusive, at times - means to prevent
certain international law mechanisms from providing legal shelter to subjects that
negatively affected competition within the US.
                                                          
71 William S. Dodge Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial
Unilateralism  39 Harv. Int'l L.J. 101.
72 Those levels are really unknowable (see Korah, supra, note 38, 51). The fact that Judge Hand relied on
hypothetical figures (as the Court of Justice did in some cases) is underlined because it is revealing.
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In essence, Alcoa mandates the application of antitrust laws to conduct abroad and
to foreign defendants as long as the conduct was meant to and in fact produced a negative
effect on competitive conditions in the US. The core of this doctrine has never been
seriously disputed in spite of the various defenses that may find application on account of
the nationality of the defendant, the place where the conduct takes place, the degree of
involvement of foreign sovereigns or consideration of political soundness and
opportunity.73
The Court of Justice has always been unwilling to adopt the same rule. In part,
this can probably be explained in the light of the criticism that has been repeatedly raised
(especially - but not only - outside of the US) in connection with the assertion of
jurisdiction by US courts in application of the effects doctrine. It “has been heavily
criticized because apparently it did not require [in itself] that the predicate effect be of
any particular magnitude or character in order to support jurisdiction. Unmoderated,
Alcoa provided no logical limit to American court jurisdiction.”74
Indeed, the difficulty with finding a logical or intrinsic limit to the potentially
unlimited scope of a doctrine merely based on the occurrence of some effect is reflected
in the numerous endeavors to reformulate and redefine Alcoa’s language. Of course, such
redefinition has always consisted of specifying and circumscribing the required intended
effect and providing both quantitative and qualitative evaluation criteria.75
                                                          
73 See Defenses and Exemptions to Application of Antitrust Laws in Foreign Commerce ABA-ALD Ch.
XII.H
74 Dieter G.F. Lange and John Byron Sandage The Wood Pulp Decision and Its Implications for the Scope
of EC Competition Law [1990] C.M.L.R. 136, 141.
75 The number of cases in which such redefinition has been attempted is huge and it is not relevant to
properly examine the implications of all the most important decisions at this time. By way of example,
courts have referred to “direct and material effect”, “substantial impact”, “any effect that is not both
insubstantial and indirect”, “actions gravely impairing significant American interests”.  See Russell J.
Davis Extraterritorial Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to Acts Occurring in Foreign Commerce 40
A. L. R. Fed. 343, 2a
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Understandably, broad or possibly exorbitant jurisdiction criteria are likely to be
welcomed by enforcement agencies. In fact, within the EC the Commission proposed the
adoption of the effects doctrine in order to deal with cases concerning non-European
defendants or conduct occurring outside the Community as early as 1964. However, it
must be noted that even though the Commission openly approved the doctrine, it never
exactly paralleled the approach of US authorities. In particular, no attempts of reaching
conduct that affected European interests anywhere in the World have been made, while it
has always been maintained that anticompetitive effects should occur within the
boundaries of the Community.76
Yet, the Court of Justice never seemed to share the Commission’s views. On one
hand in Beguélin it stated that “the fact that one of the undertakings which are parties to
the agreement is situated in a third Country does not prevent application of that provision
since the agreement is operative on the territory of the Common Market”.77 On the other
hand, in spite of such seemingly plain adoption of the doctrine, “[a]rgume t quickly
broke out about how obiter the dictum was and whether or not this constituted an
endorsement of the (or indeed an) effects doctrine.”78 As a matter of fact, extraterritorial
jurisdiction was not really an issue in Beguèlin, a case where the involved non-European
firm was not a party to the proceedings at all, let alone the target of any direct sanctions.79
Also, it remains that Dyestuffs, decided after Beguélin, was resolved by resorting to the
Economic Unit Theory instead of the rejected effects doctrine, which confirms the
disagreement between the Court and the Commission.
                                                          
76 Roger P. Alford supra note 69, 28-30.
77 Béguelin Import Co. v. GL Import-Export S.A. 1971 E.C.R. 949, 959 (§ 11)
78 Leon Brittan Competition Policy and the Merger Control in the Single European Market (1991), 6.
79 See James F. riedberg supra, note 49, 309.
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b) Wood Pulp and the Implementation Approach
Because of the inherent limitation of the Economic Unit Theory it remained the
need to provide a solution that was more comprehensive and effective on one side and
more respectful of the legal autonomy of a subsidiary on the other. At the same time, the
solution had to be somehow different from the effective but criticized Alcoa doctrine (or
the Court would prove inconsistent with its own opinions). In response to this, the Court
of Justice came to the formulation of the so-called implementation approach in the
notorious Wood Pulp case.80
From a factual standpoint, what needs to be preliminarily highlighted is the
identity of the participants in the international cartel. Because the production of wood
pulp in the Member States is negligible and EC-based firms can only concentrate in the
manufacturing of the finished product after importing the raw material, anticomp t tive
agreements among firms based in the producing Countries took place. A number of
Scandinavian and North American firms were involved, both individually and in the
person of export associations, in the definition of restrictive agreements that heavily
impaired imports of wood pulp to the EC.
As anticipated (supra, chapter I), nothing prevents the Commission from
proceeding against entities other than undertakings in spite of the purposes for which they
have been established (including whether or not they are non-profit entities). All the
American participants to the cartel belonged to Kraft Export Association (KEA), an
association availing itself of the exemption from US antitrust provided by the Webb-
Pomerene Act. A number of the participant firms and the trade association itself did not
have an establishment within the EC, which meant that - before it could issue any fine -
the Commission had to exert jurisdiction without relying on the Economic Unit Theory.
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The Commission started by stating that the Treaty applies to practices that may
affect trade between Member States “even if the undertakings and associations […] are
established or have their headquarters outside the Community, and even if the restrictive
practices in question also affect markets outside the EEC.”81 Without more, this statement
would be so broad as to equal the strictest form of the effect doctrine, as it would be
liable to embrace any effects regardless of whether the contested activity was intended to
affect the EC markets at all. The Commission then added a limitation in that it specified
that it had jurisdiction over the defendants because “the effect of the agreements and
practices on prices […] within the EEC was not only substantial b t intended, and was
the primary and direct result of the agreements and practices.”82
While such language certainly aims at making the assertion of jurisdiction less
exorbitant in that it seeks to establish a direct link (and could therefore be paralleled to
the various attempts of US courts to redefine the scope of the Alcoa doctrine mentioned
above), it remains that the Commission unmistakably chose to re-propose the effects
doctrine.83 Under the circumstances of the case, where the concerted practices regarded
some two thirds of the exports to the Community and almost the same amount of the
overall consumption, the effects could reasonably seem substantial enough for the
Commission to establish its jurisdiction even though the defendants’ intention seemed to
be more inferred than positively demonstrated. In fact, it should bot be neglected that - if
accepted - the Commission’s theory would have remained and could have been employed
under less clear circumstances.
                                                          
81 1985  O.J. (L 85) 1, § 79.
82 Id. (emphasis added).
83 Scholars generally have no doubt that the Commission deliberately adopted the effects doctrine. See for
instance Steven T. Gubner Wood Pulp - The European Economic Community and Effects Doctrine
Jurisdiction: The Community’s New Weapon 3 Transnat’l Law. 759, 765.
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Before the Court of Justice however the Commission had to present its argument
in the light of the defendants’ predictable contention that in the absence of such a link to
the EC as a registered subsidiary, international law prohibits such an expansive reading of
article 85. The disputed agreements had been reached outside the EC and the members of
the trade associations (particularly KEA) argued that since they were permitted to do so
under their national law, international comity prevented the Commission from issuing
fines that would frustrate the policy underlying the Webb-Pomerene Act.
In the Commission’s view the defendants’ arguments were meaningless, since it
maintained that its formulation differed from the exorbitant bases of the original effects
doctrine in that there was an “important third requirement […]: the concerted doctrine
must not only have a direct and substantial effect, but it must also be ‘implemented’
within the EC in order to create jurisdiction. From this […] the Commission attempted to
fashion a slender but sufficient territorial nexus ”84 Clearly, managing to qualify the
application of article 85 as territorial would entail the rejection of the objections founded
on extraterritoriality.
In the intentions of the Commission this approach was meant to make the one
based on the presence o subsidiaries unnecessary, or the case could have been resolved
through the Dyestuffs doctrine. By stating that all the defendants were “exporting dir ctly
to or doing business within the Community”, without distinguishing between those that
had “branches, subsidiaries, agencies or other establishments ”, and those that did not, the
Commission meant to emphasize the consequence that the “the concertation on prices
[…] concerned shipments made directlyto buyers in the EEC or sales made in the EEC to
buyers there.”85 In other words, it seems that the Commission tried to bypass the
structural and functional features that had been very much relevant the Economic Unit
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Theory in order to focus on the repercussions that the European buyers had to bear. It
reasoned that if the emphasis shifted on the buyers, EC institutions would have been
unquestionably competent.
Essentially, the whole idea of the Commission’s approach consisted of giving
relevance to the fact that if the concertation negatively conditioned the prices that
European buyers were to pay for wood pulp, then a territoriallink was present.
“Jurisdiction arises not from the concerted conduct of the defendants per se, but from the
tangible effect […] on the EC customer in the form of higher prices.”86 Likew s , KEA,
which was not engaged in any business itself, was to be reached by the Commission
because it acted as a trait d’union among the US participants. In spite of the lack of direct
sales, the agreements reached at its meetings were implemented while trading with
European firms. Regardless of the legality of the agreements under US national law, it
was in the trade with European buyers that they produced their effects.
Inevitably, the emphasis on the implementation of the concerted practices in terms
of higher prices for European customers did not make the Commission’s theory radically
differ from the consideration of the effects on trade operated by US courts (whether the
strict Alcoa doctrine or the more flexible conflict of laws approach of Timberlane87 are
considered). 88 Before the Court of Justice therefore the question was whether it would
agree with such a change in the jurisprudence of EC law.
Following a line of reasoning that is frequent in its decisions, the Court of Justice
started form the premise that the case at hand regarded world-wide commerce. Such
consideration is particularly important in the light of the fact that the Court did not
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88 See Leon Brittan Competition Policy and the Merger Control in the Single European Market (1991), 10
(supporting the conclusion that in the Wood Pulp case the Commission plainly intended to apply the effects
doctrine by also citing the yearly report on competition issued by the  Commission itself).
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exactly follow the Commission in its (possibly more straightforward) attempt to use the
effects doctrine but brought the Commission’s conclusions into the broader framework of
international law.
The Court found the Commission’s determination of the scope of EC law to be
“not incorrect”.89 However, it was also confronted with the contention that the assessment
of jurisdiction was contrary to international law in that the Commission’s theory was
merely based on the effects that the defendants’ conduct outside the EC had produced
within it. What the Court did was to focus on the conduct as disassembled into two
elements.
Firstly, it considered the decision-making process, which consisted of conduct that
had been accomplished completely outside the EC. Therefore, with respect to it, the EC
could not seek to establish jurisdiction unless it adopted the effects doctrine. Secondly, it
considered the implementation of the agreement, in the form of the sales performed
within the Common Market. The Court found that the parties to the cartel could not
escape the prohibition of article 85 simply by forming their agreements outside the EC
and later “exporting” them to the EC along with the exportation of wood pulp. Finally,
focusing on the place of implementation, the Court felt it could disregard the presence of
establishments within the EC: because of that territorial link the application of article 85
would remain territorial.90 Of course, to achieve this, the Court had to consider the
primary and the secondary element of the conduct as equally relevant.91
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90 Wood Pulp, §§ 17-18. “The producers implemented their pricing agreement within the Common Market.
It is immaterial whether or not they had recourse to [establishments] within the Community in order to
make their contracts […]. Accordingly, the Community’s jurisdiction […] is covered by the territoriality
principle as universally recognized in public international law”.
91 Gubner, supra, note 85, 787.
34
c) Effects doctrine versus implementation approach
Some commentators maintain that there is indeed no difference at all between the
effects doctrine and the implementation approach. It is argued that if the place of
implementation is the decisive factor, “undertakings implementing anticompetitive
conduct within the Community will now be subject to ‘effects’ jurisdiction regardless of
whether they have agents or maintain subsidiaries.”92
Yet, at least conceptually, a difference between the effects doctrine and the Court
of Justice’s implementation approach should remain. “Selling directly into the
Community at prices agreed outside was implementation in the Community of an
agreement formed elsewhere. There was therefore conduct within the Community”.93 The
distinction between the implementation of an agreement within the EC and the agreement
itself aims at emphasizing the complementary nature of the two aspects in order to
support the conclusion that jurisdiction over non-European subjects remains strictly
territorial. Therefore, it is considered as subject to principles that are “universally
recognized in public international law.”94 Apart from the lack of general consensus about
this statement, there remains the fact that - whatever the reason - unlike US authorities,
the Court of Justice seemed to feel compelled to comply with recognized  principles of
international law.
Undeniably, the question remains of whether any practical consequences stem
from the Court’s orientation and such conceptual distinction. If not, the EC approach
would ultimately consist of a formal device.95 As noted, the effects doctrine, if unlimited,
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95 That the implementation approach is but a seemingly less exorbitant assertion of jurisdiction has been
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is liable to reach virtually any distortion of competition regardless both of the nationality
of the defendants and the place where conduct actually occurred. Instead, in the
intentions of the Court of Justice the implementation approach should not be interpreted
so as to completely disregard the lack of positive conduct within the Union. As noted
above, US authorities have used the effects doctrine in order to reach conduct that
harmed American interests anywhere in the world.96 In those cases, the consideration of
“consequences to the American economy and policy” were found to “permit no
alternative to firm judicial action enforcing [US] Antitrust laws abroad.”97
If the theoretical foundations of a legal doctrine matter at all, a similar result
appears to be possible only by adopting the effects doctrine. Therefore, harming
European interests from the outside without creating a territorial link (such as the
implementation of the violation within the EC) should be considered an excessively
weak, generic connection for EC law to apply. As discussed below, cases that in the
opinion of critics challenge the validity of this statement - such as Boeing - rest on
different, specific jurisdictional bases (provided by the EC merger regulation).
Considering the example of violations affecting the imports to the EC, it may be
that some conduct of undertakings that are not present within the EC formally meets the
requirements of a violation of either article 85 or 86. Also, there could be an affect over
the European market in the sense that EC-based firms directly buy from those
undertakings, concluding and performing purchase contracts outside of the EC. While
such cases are liable to be reached by the effects doctrine,98 he ret cally it should not be
                                                          
96 Roger P. Alford supra note 69, 28-30. US courts have found that they have subject matter jurisdiction on
account of the far reaching language of the Sherman Act. In Manningto Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.
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confused with the fact that a violation will be actually sanctioned in the merits. Courts within the US
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so under the implementation approach. At least, not if the EC purchasers are passively
subject to similar anticompetitive practices (otherwise, the purchasers would be fined for
dealing with non-reachable firms pursuant to article 15 of regulation 17/62).
Yet, such conclusion should be read in the light of the of the part of Wood Pulp
that concerned KEA. Being essentially the legalized forum where US producers could
meet and reach their agreements and not a trading entity itself, it was not directly engaged
in any business with the European purchasers. However, its role was not ignored in the
judgement as one might expect. The Court of Justice found that its role was such that the
decision making process that occurred within it could not be distinguished from the
conduct of the participants. In fact all the KEA members, even those that had not taken
part to the meetings where pricing agreements had been reached, were bound by KEA’s
by-laws to hold all unanimous decisions regarding prices as binding. 99
Because of the factual setting of the case and KEA’s role and operative methods,
the Court announced that it could exert jurisdiction over it on account of the essentially
unitary nature of the conduct of KEA and its single members. Unfortunately, the
language of the decision does not provide a clear definition of what conduct, what
activity is necessary in order for jurisdiction to be asserted in less peculiar circumstances.
Most important, of course, is the fact that in spite of the relevance of its conduct in
the decision-making process, eventually KEA was not fined. The Court in fact found that
KEA, since it was not involved in the manufacturing nor in the direct selling to EC-based
purchasers, did not participate to the implementation of the agreement. “The Court’s
refusal to sustain liability against KEA suggests, perhaps, an important limitation on the
                                                                                                                                                                            
disagree as for the opportunity to match a transnational foreign firm’s conduct in its home country with that
within the US (see infra, the discussion under article 86).
99 “The unanimous agreement of the members present is also binding on members who are absent when the
decision is adopted.” It was then found to be apparent “that KEA’ s price recommendations cannot be
distinguished from the pricing agreements concluded by undertakings which are members of the Pulp
Group and that KEA has not played a separate role in the implementation of those agreements.” W od
Pulp, § 26.
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traditional effects test: ‘implementation’ appears to mean engaging in a transaction with
an EC customer in furtherance of an illegal agreement.”100
Ultimately, in order to draw a line between the implementation approach and the
effects doctrine, one probably has to rely on the fact that the former is said by its
proponents to require a stronger link to the EC than the latter to the US. As Sir Brittan put
it, “implementing conduct has to be direct, substantial and foreseeable for jurisdiction to
be engaged.”101 At a first glance, Sir Brittan’s definition resembles in its very inspiration
the various adjustments that the effects doctrine went trough in US courts. From this
perspective, even the definition provided by an EC Commissioner would seem to fail to
respond to the argument that the implementation approach is but a different name for the
same theory.
On the other hand, others underline that, read carefully, Wood Pulp proves
different from the Alcoa approach in that it contains more limitations to the possibility of
establishing jurisdiction. In particular, the emphasis on the requirement that the conduct
affect directly the Common Market could be properly weighed by comparing the Court’s
and the Commission’s opinions in Wood Pulp with respect to KEA.102 As noted, the latter
plainly proposed the adoption of the effects doctrine and eventually fined KEA, thereby
basically unifying its treatment to that of the other defendants. The former started by
stressing KEA’s role in the formation of the anticompetitive agreements as
undistinguishable from that of its participants (thereby giving the impression that
condemnation should follow), but then ended with finding KEA’s co duct not to
integrate a violation.
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In the Court’s opinion one could see a “causation link” between the lack of direct
sales to EC buyers and the lack of direct effects. “By direct, the Court evidently meant
that a defendant must in some fashion be a party to actual sales to an EC purchaser.”103
If accepted, this observation provides a working distinction between the two
jurisdictional theories. To request that an individual or an entity be positively a party t  a
transaction represents a requirement that could be said to be more detailed and qualified
than the generic participation to antic mpetitive practices or the causation, in some
unspecified fashion, of a negative effect over price, output or other factors affecting the
availability of commodities or services in a given Country.104
Also, it has been suggested that, possibly because of the intention of remaining
within the criteria of international law, the Court showed a more lenient approach with
respect to non-EC firms in the event that the anticompetitive agreement does not in fact
reach the operative stage. In itself, the language of article 85 includes both practices that
have the object or effect of harming competition. Plainly, an agreement that falls short of
producing negative effects would not be considered less illegal than one that was
successfully implemented. Yet, in Wood Pulp the Court seemed to find that a clear and
demonstrated intent must be coupled with some substantial and foreseeable effect.
Therefore, anticompetitive “schemes by non-EC undertakings to restrain competition
would not violate Article 85 so long as the scheme was never carried forward to the point
of sales at fixed prices”,105 which does not hold true in the case of schemes by EC
undertakings.
It must be finally noted that not all commentators accept such conclusions,
maintaining that the differences between the two theories are more asserted than real.
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Some simply believe that no practical difference whatsoever exists between the EC and
US approaches and conclude that the “although the EC and US approaches differ, they
usually arrive at the same result: the extraterritorial assertion of antitrust laws”.106 Others
note any practical differences, if any, would be limited to a series of rare, marginal
situations. For instance, such would be the case of agreements between non-EC buyers
not to purchase from EC producers or between non-EC producers not to sell at allto EC
distributors (as opposed to selling at fixed prices or other violations).107 Under similar
views the implementation approach would be a far cry from proposing a new,
autonomous jurisdictional criterion (which in its turn would make it not different from
the numerous redefinition attempted by US courts)108
Should the idea underlying the implementation approach be that, no matter how,
“the sale of goods into the Community at prices determined by collusion between
producers elsewhere must engage [EC] jurisdiction”,109 any effort to distinguish the two
theories would be vain. In the absence of cases that help define more accurately the scope
of such distinction it remains that EC institutions, particularly the Commission, should
                                                          
106 Laura E. Keegan The 1991 US/EC Competition Agreement: A Glimpse of the Future trough the United
States v. Microsoft Corp. Window 2 J. Int’l Legal Stud. 149, 158.
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109 Joseph P. Griffin Extraterritoriality in U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Enforcement 67 Antitrust L.J. 159, 187.
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accept to renounce to exert jurisdiction and ultimately exclude certain violations from
their purview.110
International conflicts and cooperation
a) Jurisdictional conflicts, the OECD Recommendations and International Comity
If exorbitant jurisdictional criteria are always likely to bring about some
controversy around the definition of the competent Country, the same is particularly true
in the case of Antitrust. Of course each Nation has a vivid interest in maintaining its
national market free from concerted or unilateral practices that negatively affect
competitive conditions. Output reductions, lack of innovation and higher consumer prices
obviously harm a Country’s economy.
At the same time, it could well be that a given Country has a vivid interest in
protecting national businesses both from competition from outside (producers of a given
commodity exporting to the Country in question, thereby diminishing the business of
national manufacturers) and from competition they are bound to meet in the transnational
arena. It is all too obvious that closing the borders from imports and encouraging national
firms to gain supracompetitive profits in other national markets would help the economy
of a Country thrive. It is not surprising that Antitrust has increasingly become the
battlefield of vehement battles.111 Obviously, the continuous increase in World trade is
liable to provide more and more potential controversy, as each Country would rather
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regulate international trade to its best interest and make the most out of World
competition.
Similar plain considerations are at the very foundations of the character of
international antitrust, which, not surprisingly, until very recently was essentially non-
existent. Indeed, one could speak of international antitrust law when referring to a case
where national authorities of a Country investigate, prosecute or fine a firm that is based
in another Country. In this sense, the main peculiarity concerning the EU is the fact that
the Union is a supranational entity itself and therefore a creature of international law.
“Other than among the member states of the European Communities (EC) there is no
international law of antitrust.  No internationally agreed-upon rul s of subject matter
jurisdiction have emerged in antitrust cases.”112
Yet, as discussed in this chapter, the way EC institutions asserted jurisdiction in
the cases analyzed so far is very much the same of that of any national institution. This is
absolutely clear when rethinking of KEA, the Webb-Pom rene Act and the principle
underlying the act as contrasted with the interest of the EC.
From the standpoint of the history of international relations, the 1980s were the
time when some EC Member States, such as Great Britain and France, enacted legislation
specifically designed to limit, oppose and possibly frustrate the enforcement of the
Sherman Act with regard to their national firms.113 Mechanisms (claw-back laws) were
designed to help national firms recover before their national Courts part of the losses they
had suffered in the form of treble damages awarded by US courts or to prevent the
gathering of evidence.114
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The basic limitation to the applicability of national antitrust legislation to foreign
firms consisted of comity, a notion of international public law. Not belonging specifically
to the field of antitrust enforcement, comity can be defined in general terms as a
mechanism that keeps one Nation’s laws from finding application in the light of the
recognition of a specific, conflicting interest of another Nation. “Comity, in the legal
sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation […] nor of courtesy and good will […] It
is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive
or judicial acts of another nation”.115
 International comity is also at the foundations of the Recommendations of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD
Recommendations),116 in which the EC participates. Even though comity is generally
recognized as a viable means to resolve jurisdictional controversies, its traditional
limitation rests on the lack of a bright line definition concerning the degree of tolerability
of conduct that is illegal under the laws of the concerned Nation and is instead allowed
under the national laws of the involved firm.
As Sir Brittan put it, the Commission considers itself “obliged to have regard to
comity when exercising its jurisdiction in cases with a foreign element [and] respects
scrupulously the relevant OECD recommendations”.117 Yet, from the standpoint of their
legal nature, the Recommendations are… recommendations. They do no consist of
positive, binding obligations for the participating Nations. “Assent to intentionally vague
recommendations is not equivalent to a commitment to follow those recommendations in
specific circumstances, nor is it equivalent to an agreement that a nation may enforce the
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recommendations against aliens acting outside its territory.”118 Considering similar
premises, it is not surprising that they could not represent a viable forum for the
harmonization of the enforcement efforts of each participating Nation.
One year before the publication of the 1986 OECD Recommendations  the
Commission reasoned that if the application of EC Competition Law does not require the
involved undertakings to act in a way that is contrary to a domestic rule of law and if it
does not “adversely affect important interests of a non-Member Stare”, EC law will
apply. Immediately afterwards, the Commission specified that “such an interest would
have to be so important as to prevail over the fundamental interest of the Community that
competition within the common market is not distorted” 119
When Wood Pulp was before the Court of Justice few years later, the participants
in KEA understandably argued that they should be exempted from the application of EC
Competition Law because of the exemption of the Webb-Pomer ne Act, which made it
perfectly legal for them to meet and concert export trade conditions. As discussed above,
legislation of that kind cannot reasonably be expected to keep another Nation from
enforcing its own antitrust legislation. The Court’s response was clear:
“There is no need to inquire into the existence in international law
of such a rule since it suffices to observe that the conditions for its
application are in any event not satisfied. There is not, in this case, any
contradiction between the conduct req iredby the United States and that
required by the Community since the Webb Pomerene Act merely
exempts the conclusion of export cartels from the application of United
States anti-trust laws but does not require such cartels to be
concluded.”120
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Very clearly, at least in the field of Competition Law, the position of the
Communitarian institutions is that international comity only matters in the event an
objective conflict between two Nations’ legislation exists. The main, if not only, criterion
rests on the circumstance whether one or more firms ust abide by two conflicting bodies
of rules. To the extent that they are required by law to behave in a certain way which
integrates a violation of EC Competition Law, the following violations will be excused.
Because of the very nature of international comity, that is of mutual recognition,
the Community’s approach should be coupled with that of the other Nations, whose
legislation conflicts with EC law. With specific regard to the US, which participates in
the OECD as well, in recent years its extraterritorial antitrust enforcement appears to
have been boosted in consequence of a decision of the Supreme Court, Ha tford Fire,121
and the publication of the 1995 Guidelines for International Operations of the Department
of Justice.
Hartford Fire concerned a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act by a group of
insurers and reinsurers, some of which were based in London and had no significant
connection to the US other than the involvement in the case. As expected, the London
reinsurers claimed that their conduct was absolutely legal under the laws of the United
Kingdom. The Supreme Court responded that “The Sherman Act covers foreign conduct
producing a substantial intended effect in the United States, and […] concerns of comity
come to play, if at all, only after a court has determined that the acts complained of are
subject to Sherman Act jurisdiction.”122
The Supreme Court found that unless the defendants could not objectively comply
with both American and their national legislation, no appreciable conflict would come
into being. Also, unlike the mentioned Commission’ decision in Aluminum Imports, the
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language of the court did not seem to admit that compliance with a stro g national policy
(yet falling short of legislative prescription) would excuse defendants for not abiding by
US legal requirements.123 In essence, first jurisdiction is exerted in any event; secondly,
legal compulsion will be considered a viable defense.124
Without purporting to fully analyze the decision, it is worth noticing that the
dissent argued that the case at hand was peculiar in that the nationality of the defendants,
their place of business and the place where conduct had occurred all indicated in an
unusually clear fashion that the US should abstain from judging the British defendants. In
essence, to require absolute coercion by the national law of the defendants even in the
light of the facts at issue would be tantamount to deny the practical applicability of
comity at all.125
Yet, Hartford Fire was assumed as a model in the 1995 Guidelines for
International Operations published by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
The 1995 guidelines purport to completely extend the application of US antitrust laws to
foreign entities on account of their conduct abroad, which will include criminal
prosecution by the Department of Justice in case of hard-core violation of the Sherman
Act such as horizontal agreements to fix prices or restrict output.
As a matter of fact, a 1997 Circuit Court decision, Nippon Paper,126 testifies the
enactment of such policy: there, the First Circuit relied heavily on Hartford Fireto
extend the applicability of the criminal sanctions of the Sherman Act to foreign
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defendants on account of conduct occurred abroad.127 The 1995 Guidelines, coupled with
the Supreme Court’s holding in Hartford Fire apparently suggest that neither nationality
nor consistency with another Country’s strong policies will determine a more flexible
approach in analyzing their conduct or its effect on the US.128
b) The EC/US agreement.  Positive Comity.
In the light of the considerations above it is not surprising that many
commentators advocated a political solution to the controversy relentlessly arising on the
two sides of the Atlantic. Unilateralism is bound to bring about an endless series of
retaliatory measures that are capable of blocking the implementation of antitrust law at
any stage, from discovery to the enforcement of a decision. If, historically, the fact that
the US courts were the first to systematically claim their jurisdiction with respect to
international cases, the discussed developments of EC law understandably are liable to
bring about - as in fact they have - more controversy.
The enactment of an EC regulation concerning mergers, because of the likelihood
that it would apply to transnational structural operations, caused then Competition
Commissioner B ittan to urge the conclusion of an international treaty or other informal
agreement between the EC and the US to deal with bilateral antitrust relations.
Eventually, because unilateral exemptions or assertions of jurisdiction (whatever the
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jurisdictional doctrine) had failed to provide a solution that be acceptable for both the
enforcing agencies and the businesses an agreement was reached in 1991.129
“[R]ather than seeking primarily to protect the sovereign interests of one
jurisdiction against encroachments by the antitrust authorities of the other, the agreement
between the United States and the European Commission is more clearly designed to
facilitate cooperative, and in some cases coordinated, enforcement by antitrust
authorities”130 The importance of the agreement firstly rests on the legal nature of its
provisions, which are binding. The US and the EC chose to abide by formal obligations
regarding antitrust enforcement which is of course a step forward from the discretional
nature of the OECD Recommendations.
i. notification
Structurally, the first element of the agreement concerns the notification
requirement. Each party must notify the other whenever its enforcement activities are
likely to affect “important interests” of the other.131 In t  absence of a definition of
important interest applicable to an undetermined series of circumstances, article II § 2
establishes that notification is appropriate in a number of specifically listed situations that
should trigger the fulfillment of the obligation.132
A diversified  exception is provided for the case of mergers, which is the only
case where the nationality of the involved entity matters in determining the applicable
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notification obligation. Pursuant to it, the Commission is required to notify the US
government:  a) when notice of the transaction is published in the Official Journal;
b) when EC competition authorities decide to initiate proceedings;  and c) before
adopting a decision.133 It follows that in any case other than a merger,  the Commission is
not required to notify the Justice Department of an investigation involving activities
substantially taking place in the Community for the only reason that US firms are
involved.
ii. exchange of information
Any of the Parties will provide the other with significant information concerning
anticompetitive activities taking place in the other’s territory and with requested
information that is relevant to enforcement activity. However, an exception apply when
information exchange is prohibited by confidentiality laws or is incompatible with
important interests of the Party that has the information in object.134
iii. cooperation and coordination
The agreement requires the Parties to assist each other and to coordinate their
enforcement activities. However, coordination is not mandatory, as the Parties “may”
agree to coordinate their efforts.135 Again, the “important interests” exception applies.
However, the Parties are committed to consider their mutual interests in order to
coordinate their investigative activities, which is designed to reduce the possibility that
activities end with being in fact merely duplicated.
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iv. positive comity, adversely affected interests and avoidance of conflicts
The positive comity clause (article V) represents one of the most significant
innovations introduced by the agreement and can be better understood if read together
with the following two. Positive comity in a sense supersedes ‘traditional’ comity, which
by contrast can be defined negative comity in that, as discussed, it merely consists of a
self-restraining approach.
Here, it is agreed that when one Party (for instance the Commission) believes that
important EC interests are adversely affected by anticompetitive activities that take place
within US and violate US antitrust laws, the Commission may request that the US initiate
enforcement activities. Once it has received the notification containing the necessary
information, the requested Party will consider whether to initiate or expand enforcement
activities (which remains a discretional decision). 136
Moreover, the Parties, pursuant to article VI,  “shall” recognize that besides
infringing one’s Competition Law, anticompetitive practices could be particularly
harmful to the other’s interests.137 Such recognition will occur in all stages of the said
activities, from the determination concerning whether to initiate enforcement activities,
the scope of such activities to the application of remedies or penalties.138
Even though the requested Party would not be under any obligation to act and the
requesting Party would not be obligated to abstain from undertaking its own activities,
the gap between positive and negative comity remains remarkable (as it will be discussed
more extensively below in this section).
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v. consultations and confidentiality
The Parties are committed to expeditious mutual consultation upon either one’s
request.139 While consultation appears to be a natural provision in the context of an
agreement aiming at enforcement cooperation, it will be no exception to the limitation of
confidentiality.
Confidentiality operates to limit the scope of the agreement within the boundaries
of any important interests of either Party not to disclose and within legislative disclosure
prohibitions.140 Also, it should be noted that the Parties agreed to maintain the fruits of
their cooperation as exclusive, as they are committed not to disclose to third parties (that
is antitrust agencies of Nations that are not a party to the agreement) whatever
information they have confidentially exchanged.141
vi. the 1998 renewed agreement on positive comity
In 1998 the US and the EC partially revised the agreement with the purpose of
redefining the positive comity clause without altering the agreement as such, which
remains fully in force.142 The revision is also partial in the sense that it does not regard
the field of mergers and acquisitions, on account of the differences that exist between EC
and US procedure with respect to this area of antitrust.143
It is specified that a Party may request the other to initiate enforcement activities
and adopt remedies in accordance with the requested Party’s antitrust laws regardless of
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whether the requesting Party has taken any step concerning the case at issue.144 The
requesting Party may or will (depending on the anticompetitive impact of the practices
over it and the effectiveness of the measures adopted by the requested Party) defer or
suspend its own activities. The presumption (as specified by the second part of article IV)
is that the requested Party will use its best efforts to comply with the request.145 Even
though neither Party is precluded from eventually starting or restarting its own
procedures, the requesting Party “shall” inform the requested Party of the reasons for
which it chooses not to defer or suspend its activities in case the requested Party has
complied with all the formal and substantive requirements set forth for the enforcement
activities.146
The possibility for a Party to request the other to intervene regardless of the
commencement (or imminent commencement) of its own activities may be regarded as a
step forward with respect to the 1991 agreement. There, a provision conceded that while
a Party is to take the other’s important interests into account, in the absence of direct
involvement of the latter into a single case, those interests should be reflected in
antecedent laws or decisions.147
vii. conclusions
In sum,  the agreement, especially as far as the positive comity clause is
concerned, may prove extremely effective. One may not fully agree with the definition of
negative comity as a “doctrine of politeness and good manners between nations”.148 Still,
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the difference between it and the US/EC agreement is noteworthy. As noted, it contains
binding provisions between the Parties. On the other hand, the ‘important interests’
limitation clearly reveals that the results that the Parties will be able to reap from it
largely depend on their attitude, as case-by-case relations and negotiations will determine
the application of the cooperation clauses or, by contrast, of the important interests
exception.149
The consideration is indeed obvious in the light of the fact that the solution to
bilateral controversy is essentially political, even though it found practical application by
means of a legal instrument such as an international treaty. Because of its nature, the
agreement only applies to bilateral relations between antitrust agencies of the US and EC.
Nowhere in the agreements are other subjects (such as economic entities, transnational
companies) referred to, which does not come as a surprise in the context of international
law, that is a legal system of sovereigns rather than individuals.
“The Agreement is among government agencies, it provides no rights to
individuals or enterprises.  Thus, for example, unless existing confidentiality laws require
notification, companies have no right to know whether information they supplied to one
Party has been transferred by that Party to the other Party.” 150 On one hand,  as it has
been commented, it is possible for a company to make a complaint to one agency and
thereby “request [it] to invoke the positive comity provisions of the agreement, intervene
(via amicus briefs or otherwise) in pending private litigation, or both” .151 On the other
hand, similar initiatives could be regarded as falling within the possibility of requesting a
                                                          
149 Others suggest that the degree of cooperation also depends upon the degree of recognition and respect
that each authority is able to “impose” on the other. In that sense, the criticized treatment of the
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger helped make clear how serious the Commission is. See Thomas
Lampert International Cooperation Among Competition Authorities [1999] E.C.L.R. 214, 218.
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governmental institution to act in a certain way in defense of private interests. While that
possibility is generally recognized and has been a viable way of protecting private
interests in the international law arena for a long time, governmental authorities maintain
their discretion and are not obliged to act in a certain way.
Unquestionably, in the light of the discussed tensions that survive in the field of
antitrust enforcement, the possibility of requesting - not yet requiring - the antitrust
agency of a foreign Nation to proceed in defense of the requesting Party’s interests, is
unprecedented. Positive comity differs from negative comity in that it consists of positive
acts of cooperation and reciprocal assistance rather than decisions not to act. It is
certainly a means of avoiding controversy, but it is also the “cornerstone of broad
schemes of cooperation”.152
Two related advantages immediately follow from the enactment of the agreement:
First, a potentially revolutionary solution is provided with respect to the questionable
unilateral assertions of jurisdiction that normally occur in the international arena. In a
sense, the agreement is in fact liable to by-pass and thereby avoid the question of
jurisdiction by simply providing a chance to entrust the national authorities of a Country
to conduct the appropriate proceedings. Recalling the comments reported above
concerning the attempt to avoid instead of solving extraterritoriality issues probably gives
the measure of the potential improvement.
Second, and most important from the standpoint of the execution of investigations
and the gathering of the necessary elements, it cannot be omitted that once one agency
has requested its homologue to take action, the latter will be in better operative conditions
when conducting the necessary proceedings, since as a national governmental authority it
will be in the position of directly exercising sovereign powers.
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It is in fact obvious that in practical terms the first problems that are bound to be
encountered on either side of the Atlantic in a case concerning one or more firms based
on the other is the gathering of the necessary information. Even in the absence of
legislation specifically enacted in order to prevent a foreign agency from proceeding, in
any specific case governmental and judiciary authorities may refuse to collaborate in a
more or less explicit way. 153
In the basic discussion concerning EC antitrust procedure of the first chapter,
mention was made of the broad investigating powers of the Commission. Because those
powers are obviously limited to the territory of the Member States, it is not surprising that
since the enactment of the US/EC agreement each agency has noticed a remarkable
increase in the flow of information, from which they benefit in terms of effective
enforcement.
Indeed, even though the improvement certainly regards the exchange of
information in the first place, is not limited to it. By way of example, it has been
commented that the agreement is liable to cover a loophole in the implementation
approach in that it could provide the Commission with a solution to deal with a buyers
cartel of non-EC purchasers fixing the purchase price of goods manufactured in the EC
and subsequently exported abroad.154
As discussed above, that would be anticompetitive behavior that the
implementation approach does not reach if occurring abroad. It follows that, without
resorting to exorbitant jurisdiction assertions (bound to cause protectionist reactions on
the part of the national authorities of the participants in the cartel), the Commission
would be able to prevent such cartel from negatively affecting the Common Market. The
                                                          
153 See on discovery and gathering of information Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. [1978]
A.C. 547 (H.L. 1977). Previously, other frictions had arisen when English courts refused to enforce a US
judgement against Imperial Chemical Industry favoring DuPont de Nemours.
154Joseph P. Griffin EC/US Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: Impact on Transnational Business 24 Law &
Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1051, 1060.
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fact that the EC would be able to prosecute the members of such cartel with exclusive
regard to the case that they are based within the US (to the extent that a violation of US
antitrust laws exists) and not elsewhere gives the measure of the scope and effectiveness
of the agreement.
In sum, even though the agreement cannot by itself overcome all possible
conflicting issues in the application of  antitrust to transnational companies, it does bring
about substantial improvements that could probably be better appreciated by not
excessively emphasizing the separation between jurisdictional (or in a broader sense
procedural) and substantive aspects of a antitrust cases. The fact that the immediate
object of the agreement is the establishment of certain common jurisdictional and
procedural concepts should not be considered that procedure is meaningless if not
connected to substantive provisions.
Therefore, the requisite of the infringement of antitrust legislation of the Country
whose agency is required to act does not seem to an excessively strict limitation if
regarded in the light of the circumstance that substantive EC and US provisions are a far
cry from being incompatible or helplessly different. Pursuant to the agreement EC and
US officials do not merely exchange information in a strict sense, thereby replacing the
complex and often ineffective procedure based on letters of rogatory. Cooperation also
provides a chance to exchange legal and economic analysis.155 When the object of the
officials’ analysis is more immediately related to their local market the beneficial effects
of the agreement do not show their highest potential; on the other side, “when a global
market is at stake, [and both authorities] conclude that relief is necessary, there is the
greatest potential for coordination.”156
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The most frequently criticized weakness of the agreement is the limitation
concerning confidential information as of article VIII of the 1991 agreement, since that
information is very often the most sensitive and crucial. The argument runs that the
impossibility of exchanging that kind of information substantially cripples the agreement.
Therefore, knowledge of crucial facts concerning market definition, market shares and
the like can only be exchanged as long as it is based on publicly available data,157 at le st
as long as it can be defined as business information (as opposed to agency
information).158 In spite of this, an important exception to the confidentiality limitation
applies: Firms that are subject to investigations or proceedings may agree to waive the
right to keep the information confidential.
The reason why a firm should forfeit one of its privileges rests essentially on the
advantages that may derive from a cooperative attitude. The waiver is likely to cause all
proceedings to be speedier, which is of course valuable for a firm that is being subject to
investigations. Also, by waiving confidentiality rights, the firm provides enforcement
officials with a chance to reach a concerted outcome on both sides of the Atlantic, which
of course brings about the benefit of a single (and to some extent negotiated) solution to
the relevant antitrust issues.159
Avoiding repeated or inconsistent requests separately coming from the
Commission and US agencies represent a plus that, as of the present day, could be said to
outweigh the downfalls of waiving confidentiality (such as leakage or misuse of
information).160 However, it appears that for this ‘trilateral conc tation’ concerning
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confidential information to be fully effective, it takes that the two enforcement authorities
agree to some extent on the use that should be done of the information as well as on the
conclusions that should be drawn. For instance, such was not the case in the notorious
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas case, where consensus between the Federal Trade
Commission and the EC Commission was not reached in the merits of market analysis
and anticompetitive effects over it.161
Indeed, the first application of the cooperation agreement - coupled with the
waiver of confidentiality rights - was a success to most commentators. The case
concerned Microsoft’s violation of § 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and of articles 85 and
86. In that case Microsoft agreed to waive its confidentiality rights (thereby authorizing
the Department of Justice to provide the Commission with such information) in exchange
of a settlement that kept Microsoft’s violations into account with respect both to the US
and EC. Microsoft must have concluded that facing two separated proceedings, being
potentially exposed to two sets of investigations and finally being subject to distinct
outcomes would be too detrimental for its business. “The Microsoft investigation was
unique in that Microsoft agreed to an exchange of information, which permitted closer
cooperation whereby the two competition authorities jointly negotiated an eventual
settlement.”162
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CHAPTER III
EC COMPETITION LAW: TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES
The three offenses of EC Competition Law do not represent the immediate object
of this thesis, on the assumption that the reader is to some extent familiar with it.
Therefore, thee object of this chapter is the analysis of only those aspects of articles 85 -
86 and the merger regulation that are perceived as more characteristic.
Article 85 will be discussed having vertical restraints in mind because of certain
political orientations that are regarded ad less relevant to antitrust within the US but
essential within the EC. Article 86 will be considered with respect to the consequences of
dominance in terms of special responsibility for large firms. Concerning the merger
regulation, the emphasis will be on the B eing case.
Article 85
Article 85 prohibits “all agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices”, which may encompass essentially
any kind of collusion between two or more firms. Whenever there is some evidence that
undertakings have abandoned the competitiveness that ideally characterizes their
interaction, virtually n  conduct is liable to be regarded as part of  anticompetitive
concertation. From this perspective to precisely pigeonhole the agreement under any
given juridical category - whether contract or others - is not material. In Fedetab163 
recommendation issued by a non-profit association of undertakings (therefore not an
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undertaking itself) revealing the members’ intention to compulsorily abide by its terms
was found to integrate an article 85 violation.
The Court of Justice rejected the contention that nothing less than a contract,
enforceable under national law, could trigger the application of article 85, and reasoned
that accepting the notification and complying with the recommendation fell within  the
prohibition of article 85 in that it created a sufficient probability hat the concertation in
question may have had an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on trade
between Member States.164
As the language of article 85 and Fedetabsuggest a violation must be founded on
the defendants’ positive will, which appears to be the only necessary requisite. Instead,
the form of the agreement (written or oral) is immaterial if a some anticompetitive impact
is ascertained or possible. Focus is therefore on the economic impact of the agreement
rather than on its legal nature,165 although the Commission receives criticism because it is
said to neglect economic analysis and favor a legalistic approach.
There appears to be a close relationship between the types of conduct that are
forbidden and evidentiary requirements: Because anti ompetitive conduct obviously
needs proving, prohibiting co certation only makes sense in the presence of some
element that helps recognize conduct as willfully concerted. The issue is sometimes a
subtle one, since antitrust may theoretically be meant to punish firms simply on account
of conduct that might be the fruit of concertation but might as well be the fruit of
objective economic conditions. For instance, oligopolistic markets are a thorn in the side
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of antitrust: the few firms present in the market usually gain supracompetitive profits; a
firm’s attempt to reduce prices and gain competitive level profits (usually by means of
secret discounts) in order to attract its competitors’ customers will be almost immediately
detected by its competitors, that will react. Non-concerted adaptations usually follow (so
called interdependent behavior), which in the end are likely to bring each firm’s profit
back to more than competitive levels. This puzzles antitrust theory, as while the effects of
the adaptations are likely to harm consumers as well as price fixing, competitors may
well have acted individually.166
The question of whether or not to punish such behavior is essentially a matter of
policy. In general, one may confidently maintain that more or less all legal systems
(certainly the US and EC) require some kind of willful participation. Yet, the issue rests
on the degree of willfulness that will trigger enforcement.
Such seemingly obvious thoughts become much more troublesome for the US
business that complies with §1 of the Sherman Act and is therefore used to its
requirements (as interpreted by the courts). The Sherman Act in fact prohibits explicitly
determined types of conduct (contracts, combinations and conspiracies). Broad as the
prohibition may be, it seems that article 85, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, is even
broader and intendedly undetermined. “Doctrines governing agreement issues in Section
1 cases strongly resemble standards used in conventional criminal conspiracy
litigation.”167 Needless to say, criminal standards have to be extremely rigorous and
standards have changed a great deal during the century, indeed making it more and more
difficult for governmental agencies and private plaintiffs to win their case. Without
purporting to discuss the entire history of § 1 standards, it could be mentioned that some
fifty years ago awareness of a competitor’s conduct and subsequent adaptation (so called
                                                          
166 Eleanor M. Fox and Lawrence A. Sullivan Antitrust (1989), 506-511.
167 Kovacic and Gellhorn, 225.
61
conscious parallelism) was liable to determine a violation.168 T day, standards tend to
require much more than that.169
In Dyestuffs, three simultaneous (and identical, as for each firm’s increase) price
increases in five of the then six national markets of chemical colorants occurred. To the
Commission, this could have only been explained in the presence of some kind of
concert, even if the market in question had been oligopolistic. According to the
Commission, the existence or a fortiori the positive evidence of an agreement was not a
requirement under article 85. 170
The Court of Justice reasoned that “the object is to bring within the prohibition of
[article 85] a form of coordination […] which, wit out having reached the stage where an
agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical
cooperation between them for the risks of competition . By its very nature, then, a
concerted practice does not have all the elements of a contract but may inter alia arise
out of coordination which becomes apparent from the behavior of the participants.”171
The Court conceded that parallel conduct does not necessarily amount to illegal
concert, but it implicitly endorsed the economic analysis of the Commission in that it
concluded that the defendants had managed to stabilize prices at a level different from
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that to which competition wouldhave led, which the Commission was not able to submit
in its allegations.172
The contested practice consisted of publicly announcing the increase ahead of
time, which to the defendants was legitimate as mere conscious parallelism and price
leadership. The Court did not object to the principle that in a highly concentrated market
transparency may occur. Yet, it concluded that the market was not oligopolistic and that
any of the major firms might well have tried to act independently in order to win
customers by means of price competition.173 I  f und that by increasing prices after the
announces, the defendants “eliminated all uncertainty between them as to their future
conduct and […] the risk usually inherent in any independent change of conduct.[…
which] led to the fixing of general and equal increases in prices for the markets in
dyestuffs [and] rendered the market transparent ”.174 Without further evidence, the Court
felt free to conclude that the only cause was the common intention of the parties. Indeed,
even though the Court in principle did not reject conscious parallelism, its opinion
condemned any kind of cooperation aiming at determining a “coordinated course of
action” and ensuring “its success by prior elimination of all uncertainty as to each other’s
conduct”.175
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Under EC Competition Law then detailed agreements between undertakings about
the conduct they are to put into being are unnecessary to integrate a violation, as even
gentlemen’s agreements have been object of condemnation. Also, the Commission and
the Court have shown that they will go beyond appearances in considering the actual
contribution of both parties, especially when the supposed unilateral conduct would not
have been possible without some form of acceptance.176
In its decision regarding the distribution scheme of Sandoz, implemented  through
its Italian subsidiary, the Commission focused on a standard sale provision printed
exclusively on invoices sent to Sandoz’ customers in Italy.177 Such provision aimed at
integrating the distribution contract, thereby prohibiting parallel exports from Italy to
other Member States.178 The Commission reasoned that “[a]lthough no written general
contract existed between Sandoz PF and its customers”, through its commercial
procedures Sandoz had established continuous distribution patterns that were “at least
implicitly” accepted by its customers. Invoice were docum ntary evidence of the
contractual ban on exports implemented by means of “a clause forming an integral part
of the agreement” between Sandoz PF and its customers.179
Likewise, in Ford the Court of Justice rejected the contention  that a distribution
scheme aiming at disrupting supplies of right-hand drive cars to non-British retailers was
implemented by means of Ford’s unilateral conduct (namely in the person of U.S.-
incorporated Ford Europe and the German subsidiary Ford Werke A.G.). Ford had issued
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a circular announcing the disruption, which integrated concerted conduct because
“admission to the Ford A.G. dealer network implies acceptance by the contracting parties
of the policy pursued by Ford”.180
Ford concerned a debated issue such as that of selective distribution, that is a
manufacturer’s choice to select its distributors and condition their belonging to the
distribution scheme on the fulfillment of certain requirements. Obviously, a manufacturer
may be more willing to invest in research or improvements to its products if it can devise
a way to gain high return from such expenses. By ensuring that its distributors provide
high quality services or help improve the recognition of its products, it has an incentive to
keep improving its products, which is of course beneficial for consumers. On the other
hand, free riders are said to take unjustified advantage from those investments by selling
advertised and recognized products without participating in the investments in any way.
In the end it is widely maintained that because investments are less profitable if not fully
exploitable, competition would suffer from excessively strict standards concerning
vertical restraints.
In the US the law of vertical restraints is much more flexible than in the EC.
Going back to evidentiary requirements, the U.S. Supreme Court in Monsanto required
that in order to successfully present its case the plaintiff produce evidence that tends to
exclude the possibility of independent behavior by the defendants.181 Absent direct
evidence, under this standard it would be necessary to adequately support allegations of
unity of purpose between the manufacturer and the distributor.182
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On the other hand, if the factual setting of Ford, which featured conflicting
interests between the manufacturer and its distributors (in that each of them had a direct
interest in doing business with British distributors to the exclusion of the other) is
considered, such unity of purpose could hardly be inferred.
Even though Supreme Court and the Court of Justice have recognized the
legitimacy of foreclosures in the light of the activity of free-riders, they seem to have
reached quite different conclusions. The Court of Justice has in fact recognized the
legitimate interest of a manufacturer in establishing a specialized (or selective)
distribution network and ensuring its profitability, but it does not show tolerance for those
unnecessary restrictions that conflict with one particular, and indeed peculiar, goal of EC
Competition Law: market integration (as opposed to market efficiency). 183
Limitations in price competition deriving from the existence of a selective
distribution system were said to be legitimate to the extent that they found a justification
in the higher expenses related to specially trained personnel or sophisticated equipment.
These in fact help provide consumers with  qualified and otherwise unavailable services
and performances. Ensuring high profitability to distributors by means of fixing resale
prices - resale price maintenance - is not considered to be compatible with the goals of
Competition Law, especially in view of the alternative available to the manufacturer
(namely, non admitting or expelling - according to non arbitrary criteria - those
distributors whose economic organization proves inefficient and scarcely profitable).184
It probably takes to consider the economic reality of distribution, of course
directly related to vertical restraints by its very nature, to fully comprehend the
Commission and the Court of Justice’s attitude towards the phenomenon. In particular,
distributors operate over assigned areas that, in the case of international distribution,
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often tend to coincide with national territories. This, coupled with the goals of the EC,
may help explain one of the features that contribute the most to differentiate its
Competition Law from US Antitrust - that is the failure to weigh differently horizontal
and vertical restraints. While in the U.S. the law of vertical restraints can be said to form
a set of doctrinal rules that has become clearly separate from that of horizontal restraints
and less stringent in terms of legal standards, the same is not true within the EC.185
A comparison between the Supreme Court’s rationale in Sylvania nd that of the
Court of Justice in Grundig is striking even considering the time elapsed between the two
decisions. The first  was largely based on the positive consideration of the efficiencies
that may derive from certain restraints and on the enhancements to interbrand
competition (as opposed to intrabrand) competition. In particular, it was found that
restraints to the latter could be acceptable to the extent that they brought about an
improvement of the former (and, eventually, to overall competition). It was then held that
a case-by-case approach would be the most appropriate solution for discerning between
anticompetitive and procompetitive restraints.
In the distribution contract between Grundig and Consten, the second was
appointed exclusive distributor for France in exchange of the covenant not to sell
comparable merchandise produced by Grundig’s competitors. The Court of Justice
rejected the contentions that the vertical nature of the agreement did not constitute the
required agreement between undertakings186 and did not bring about a distortion of
competition.187 The Court repeatedly emphasized the purposes of the Treaty (rather than,
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187 “The possible application of article 85 […] cannot be excluded merely because the grantor and the
concessionaire are not competitors inter se and not on a footing of equality. Competition may be distorted
67
for instance, goals such as efficiency, incentives to innovation or price reduction)and th
need to avoid the reinstatement of national barriers.
Also, confronted with an increased interstate trade of Grundig equipment and the
argument that some appreciable influence (directly imputable to the scheme) should be
proved, the Court responded that the issue was “whether the agreement is capable of
constituting a threat, either direct or indirect, actual or potential, to freedom of trade
between Member States in a manner which might harm the attainment of the objectives of
a single market. Thus the fact that an agreement encourages an increase, even a large
one, in the volume of trade between states is not sufficient to exclude the possibility that
the agreement may ‘affect’  such trade in the abovem ntioned manner.”188
After such a statement of policy (indeed very different from the efficiency-
oriented Sylvania), it is not surprising that, after quickly rejecting the presumption that
distribution restrictions are not harmful to overall competition189 the Court went so far as
to rule out the consideration of the redeeming value of vertical restraints in spite of
analytical considerations.190
As mentioned, the exclusion of ntrabrand competition has recognizable
procompetitive effects: customer services; distributive efficiencies; incentives for
                                                                                                                                                                            
within the meaning of article 85(1 ) not only by agreements which limit it as between the parties, but also
by agreements which prevent or restrict the competition which m ght ake place between one of them and
third parties. […]. [B]y such an agreement, the parties might seek, by preventing or limiting the
competition of third parties, to create or guarantee for their benefit an unjustifi d advantage at the expense
of the consumer or user, contrary to the general aims of article 85.” Id. (emphasis added).
188 Id., at 341 (emphasis added).
189 “The principle of freedom of competition concerns the various stages and manifestations of competition
. Although competition between producers is generally more noticeable than that between distributors of
products of the same make, it does not thereby follow that an agreement tending to restrict the latter kind of
competition should escape the prohibition of article 85(1 ) merely because it might increase the former.”.
Id., at 342.
190“ There is no need to take account of the concrete effects of an agreement once it appears that it has as its
object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. Therefore the absence in the contested
decision of any analysis of the effects of the agreement on competition between similar products of
different makes does not, of itself, constitute a defect in the decision.” Id.
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productive and or distributive investments, both by the distributors in first person and the
manufacturer, at least partially relieved from marketing costs. Yet, from an economic
standpoint, there are inevitable downfalls as well. These normally include higher prices
on account of the total lack of competition created by the exclusive;191 a potential output
reduction; a reduced welfare for those consumers who do not value nor need non-price
efficiencies brought about by the scheme and will have to buy a lesser quantity because
of the higher price; and a higher cost for those consumers who will buy in the same
quantity in spite of the price.192 Finally, it must not be underestimated that that
concluding that restraints to intrabrand competition will enhance interbrand competition
might in the end be overly simplistic, as weighing one type of competition against the
other is sometimes a difficult task.193
Unquestionably, the argument that the suppression of intrabrand competition is
often outweighed by the overall procompetitive effects brought about by enhancements in
interbrand competition has solid foundations. The US rule of reason, including the
analysis of the structure of the market, allows to verify the actual outcome.194 However, it
is crucial to insist that “Sylvania’s endorsement of an efficiency-based methodology for
evaluating vertical restraints focused attention on the questions of what goals antitrust
should pursue.”195
In the light of the peculiar goals of EC competition policy it appears that many of
the (Chicagoan) economic findings that made US Courts substantially legalize vertical
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restraints do not hold true within the EC.196 The EC objective of integration results in
“stricter rules on vertical territorial restrictions [and] a different method of analysis”. EC
authorities do not show the “depth of economic analysis seen in many U.S. decisions.
The EC makes no inquiry into market power (effect on intrabrand competition) or
possible conomic justifications or efficiencies”.197 Also, goals of fairness, wide access to
entrepreneurial activities and a different emphasis the attainment of generalized welfare
(referred to as the distributive purposes of EC Competition Law) rather than efficiency
alone determine a shift from the purposes of US Antitrust.198 “The protection of small
and medium firms in often justified on the assumption that this promotes competition in
the long run.”199
The EC has been considering whether to amend its orientations and if so to what
extent. Probably seeking to retain stricter control over legal developments, EC
institutions have always preferred to enact individual or collective exemptions in order to
recognize that certain formally anticompetitive practices may in the end bring about
positive effects.200 The case of distribution is exemplary:  When the Commission was
empowered to exempt firms from the application of article 85, it received many more
requests than it could handle.201 Thus, the practice of issuing block exemptions started. In
                                                          
196 Some US scholars however object to the opinion that vertical restraints are bound to increase
competitive conditions and general welfare. See Robert L. Steiner Sylvania Economics: A Critique 60
Antitrust L.J. 41 and Jonathan B. Baker Vertical restraints with Horizontal Consequences: Competitive
Effects of  “Most Favored Customer” Clauses  64 Antitrust L.J. 517.
197 Barry E. Hawk The Proposed Revisions to the Justice Department's Antitrust Guidelines for
International Operations and Recent Developments in EEC Competition Law 57 Antitrust L.J. 299, 306
(emphasis added).
198 Id., at 307.
199 Barry E. Hawk System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law 32 Comm. Mkt. L. Rev
973, 981.
200 The discipline of exemptions is one of the most peculiar characters of EC Competition Law and would
require detailed analysis, which is not within the scope of this thesis.
201 Regulation 67 of 1967 was one of the early pieces of legislation adopted following to the regulatory
scheme shortly described in the first chapter (Commission regulations being enacted in pursuance to
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the end, firms had to deal with a complex system of provisions and orientations of e
facto or de jure regulatory nature (regulations and notices), whereby the Commission
governed different economic sectors.
This approach has been criticized because of its excessively strict rules,
uncertainty, legalism, lack of economic analysis. The collapse of the system has been
described as a vicious cycle, starting from the excessively broad application of article 85
and then continuing with  the issuing of numerous block exemptions (needed in the light
of the difficulties arising out of the broad scope of article 85) and the formalism brought
by their category-based mechanism. Finally, all emphasis is on legal categories and
economic analysis is neglected. 202 The lack of economic analysis in terms of price and
output (that is in terms of the basic effects on economy, competition and the consumers),
and the omitted consideration of market power, make the Commission’s conclusion that
exclusive distribution agreements violate article 85 automatic.203
The Commission issued a Green Paper on vertical restraints,204 and  follow-up
document reconsidering the issue in the light of the opinions received from other
Communitarian Institutions, Member States, scholars and businesses on the Green
Paper.205 The prospected reform will tend to harmonize EC Law and US Antitrust. Yet,
                                                                                                                                                                            
Council regulations). It was adopted in pursuance to regulation 19/65 (see supra, chapter I) to respond to
the huge number of individual exemption requests that the Commission received. Regulation 67 is now
expired and the subject is currently covered by regulation 83 of 1983, whose provisions in part are
essentially the same.
202 Barry E. Hawk System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law 32 Comm. Mkt. L. Rev.
973, 974.
203 Id., at 975. “Market power is perhaps the most fundamental factor in competition analysis. Market
power is just as important under article 85 as it is under article 86. The fact that the legal thresholds for the
requisite degree of market power differ under article 85 and 86 should not obscure the fact.”
204 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, COM (96) 721. It is reminded that the
Green Paper does not have legislative force.
205 Communication from the Commission on the application of the Community competition rules to vertical
restraints - Follow-up to the Green Paper on vertical restraints 1998 O.J. (C 365), 3.
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this is not to say that the two are likely to be identical in the near future, as the EC does
not accept certain restrictions that recent developments made legal within the US. Such is
the case of vertical price fixing, subject to the rule of reason since the US Supreme
Court’s decision in Khan,206 which reversed the former orientation.207 W thin the US
vertically fixing maximum resale price is therefore subject to a rule of reason (efficiency-
biased) scrutiny similar to that of Sylvania. Within the EC instead it is still assumed that
fixing the maximum price will often imply that distributors charge the highest price
contractually possible, thereby alt ring the minimum price as well.
The opinion that price restraints will be equally illegal whether they are vertical or
horizontal is reaffirmed in another official document, the de minimis notice, 208 which
provides firms with indications about the Commission’s orientations.209 Indeed, the new
notice may be more relevant to the business of some transnational corporations (which
are presumptively assumed to be large companies) because one of the two threshold
criteria that limited the applicability of the notice - that based on the turnover of the firm -
has been abolished. As for the other criterion - the market share threshold - a distinction
between horizontal and vertical agreements has been introduced.210
                                                          
206 State Oil v. Khan 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
207 See Albrecht v. Herald Co. 390 U.S. 145 (1968), where the Supreme Court had found illegal per se a
distribution agreement aiming at fixing the maximum resale price.
208 Commission notice on agreements of minor importance, OJ C 372, 9/12/1997. It is a limitation to the
applicability of article 85 which operates regardless of economic sectors and concerns agreements that have
little or no anticompetitive effects on account of the dimension of the firms that take part to them. In short,
the agreements fail to meet the requirement of appreciable effect on competition.
209 It is worth mentioning that as for their legal nature, notices are not binding with respect to the
Commission, let alone the Courts. See Mort n B. Broberg The De Minimis Notice 20 European Law
Review 371, 374 [1995].
210 The market share threshold is  5 % for agreements between undertakings operating at the same business
level and 10 % for agreements between undertakings operating at different economic levels. In the case of a
mixed horizontal/vertical agreement or where it is difficult to classify the agreement as either horizontal or
vertical, the 5 % threshold is applicable. Id., § 9.
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The distinction, in practice allowing a higher threshold, confirms the more
permissive approach toward vertical agreements, consistently with the general orientation
of the Commission.211 However, the more favorable look on vertical restraints does not
go so far as to include resale price maintenance and territorial allocation.212
Article 86
Underlying policies that differ from those of the US and historical reasons of
development are at the very foundations of the jurisprudence of the offence of abuse of
dominant position in the same peculiar way as the elimination of national barriers and
market integration are at the foundations of the law of vertical restrained examined
above. Only, article 86 is arguably even more controversial in its application than article
85, related as it is to measurable yet ever controvertible concepts such as market
definition and dominance. Controversies are bound to increase when considering the
application of article 86 to transnational firms and the application of those concepts on a
world wide scale.
Indeed, the wording of article 85 and 86 differs in a seemingly minor fashion in
that the first prohibits practices that “may affect trade […] and which have as their effect
or object” some negative impact on competition, while the second prohibits any abuse “in
so far as it may ffect” trade. This has been found to require a case-by-case evaluation of
the quantitative impact of the contested practice that is based on less rigid and
                                                          
211 The discrepancy between the 10% figure of the Notice and the 20% figure of the Green Paper (which is
the proposed market share under which the Commission will deem the restraint not to be harmful to
competition) has been criticized as a demonstration that the Notice does not reflect the current orientations
of EC Competition Law. See Frances Barr The New Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor
Importance: Is Appreciability a Useful Measure? [1997] E.C.L.R. 207, 211.
212 Id., § 10 (b). These add to the horizontal “blacklisted” offences that are liable to be prosecuted
regardless of the threshold criteria.
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legislatively or jurisprudentially predetermined criteria than those that Communitarian
institutions resort to in the application of article 85.213 In particular, in cases such as
Commercial Solvents andUnited Brands the Court of Justice focused on the overall
competitive structure of the market rather than on actual effects on interstate trade,
thereby emphasizing the importance of the political (as opposed to purely economic)
purposes of Competition Law.214 Because this adds to the uncertainty that characterizes
the application of article 86, such approach is frequently criticized (particularly by US
antitrust scholars and lawyers who propose a less “contaminated” enforcement of
Competition Law).215
The contrast with US standards is important also in the light of the fact that most
landmark cases concern US-based firms. Continental Can, Philip Morris, United Brands,
Commercial Solvents Corp, General Motors were all involved in major cases that
eventually shaped the outline of article 86 jurisprudence (and prepared the subsequent
enactment of the merger regulation).
One could guess that the long post-war era and the crisis of the 1970s took their
toll on European undertakings, which therefore were not always in the position to
consistently increase in size and, therefore, control a substantial share of a given market.
Also, the more prompt availability of capitals in the US influences the enforcement of
antitrust (with special regard to the definition of a relevant market and entry barriers). In
this sense, under US standards - especially on account of the general acceptance gained
by the Chicago School - very large investments that are necessary for a firm to enter a
market are not deemed to represent an entry barrier: if a market is profitable, it is
                                                          
213 See Luigi Ferrari Bravo and Enzo Moavero Milanesi Lezioni di Diritto Comunitario - Le R gole
Antitrust (1995).
214 Id., 344.
215 See for instance Thomas E. Kauper The Problem of Market Definition under EC Competition Law 20
Fordham Int’l L. J. 1682, 1682-1688.
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assumed that there will always be a potential competitor that will readily punish the
behavior of a monopolist that gains supracompetitive profits. Unless particular conditions
are found to exist, which is currently less and less frequent, most markets are deemed to
be competitive and “barriers to entry are low or nonexistent over the long term.”216
If, instead, capitals are less readily available and the enforcing agencies are
concerned with the chances that small firms (considered as important economic actors in
that they help correct the anticompetitive tendency of a market) have, “the need for
capital may constitute a barrier to entry.”217
As a matter of fact, the Commission and the Court of Justice are sensitive to
global businesses - as their corporate and financial structure may partially insulate them
from certain competitive dynamics that concern other businesses - in a way that does not
seem to be paralleled by that of US courts. Also, US courts do not seem to worry about
the need to adapt or modify their analysis when they are confronted with cases that
include transnational elements (assuming that typically there will be some coincidence
between large and transnational concerns). Very often, such elements will be either
ignored or weighed by means of the usual analytical reasoning.218
                                                          
216 That market definition is oriented to a continuous broadening of the relevant market in question in any
single case is widely recognized, whether or not the argument is used in a polemic fashion to criticize the
opposite inclination of the Commission and the Court of Justice. See Per Jebsen and Robert Stevens supra,
note 22, 455-456.
217 Korah, supra, note 38, 15
218 In Sammi, (Vollrath Co. v. Sammi Corp., 1989 WL 201632 (S.D.Cal.); The Vollrath Co. v. Sammi
Corp, 9 F.3d 1455 (9thCir. 1993); Metro Industries Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1996)) the
Ninth Circuit rejected allegations of leveraging and anticompetitive effects over the US in two distinct
lawsuits brought against Sammi, a Korean producer of kitchenware and an importer to the US, that had
monopoly power over the Korean production and export market (also thanks to an export association that
may be paralleled to KEA). The Sammi litigation is one of the very few of the decade that regarded similar
allegations directed against foreign firms. The Ninth Circuit is one of those that rejected the inclusion of
monopoly leveraging within the practices prohibited by the Sherman Act (Alaska Airlines v. United
Airlines, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991)). Both the District Court and the Circuit Court found that, if anything,
the fact that Sammi could exploit monopoly power within Korea was beneficial to the US, as economic
theory would teach that firms cannot exploit monopoly in more than one market. Yet, the fact that the US
market of the kitchenware at issue consisted only of products imported from Korea was not given any
thought. This was because US antitrust must disregard competitive conditions in Korea
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It is hard not to notice that while the A coa doctrine was so far-reaching, often US
courts seemed blind in front of the anticompetitive potential of international commerce.
In a landmark case of the 1980s, Matsushita, 219 the Supreme Court held that American
plaintiffs could not recover treble damages from Japanese defendants on the basis of the
cartelization of their national market “because American antitrust laws do not regulate
competitive conditions of other nations’ economies”220 Inde d, while it is obvious that
US legislation cannot purport to affect business practices that remain exclusively related
to a foreign territory, id does not necessarily follow that courts should not take into
account the possibility that transnational companies exploit economic and legal
conditions of non-US markets to finance otherwise unaffordable business practices
within the US (which was the case in Matsushita). By denying that possibility the
Supreme Court arguably left the door open for an excessively definite separation between
geographic areas and markets that does not correspond to the economic reality of
internationalization of trade of modern days.
It is indeed obvious that the courts of a given Country are impotent in front of
foreclosures that their national companies may encounter while trying to compete in
those foreign markets. Going back to Matsushita, Japan has always been a difficult
environment - to say the least - for foreign firms. If it is mainly left to the executive
branch and agreements such as that described in the previous chapter to deal with such
hurdles (or even trade wars), courts may nevertheless consider the economic
ramifications of similar patterns on competition within their national market. As the
dissent in Matsushita pointed out, firms may employ certain business patterns in one
Country in combination with others elsewhere.221
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In such cases, given the impossibility for national authorities to reach practices
that would be illegal within their own territory, a solution may still be devised in order
for courts to consider the distorting ramifications of those practices in their Country
(without exerting exorbitant jurisdiction nor purporting to regulate the economy of other
Nations). Since under the approach in question conduct abroad would only matter insofar
as it allows firms to distort competition in the host Country, it is here argued that
doctrines such as monopoly leveraging or essential facilities may be an option. In fact,
what matters in leveraging cases is not just the possession of monopoly market itself
(which may be legal or simply beyond the reach of the court) but mainly its influence
over another, non-monopolized market.222 Therefore, provided that monopolistic
conditions abroad (as arguably in Matsushita) allow or cause foreign defendants to
maintain distorting practices within another, unfair competitive advantages may be
challenged through leveraging claims or by maintaining that a firm may have to abide by
stricter standards.
Within the EC, the Commission is much more inclined to avail itself of doctrines
such as leveraging and maintains a more internationalist approach. This, combined with a
third important factor - its theory concerning market definition - has caused and causes
pains to firms that are used to US-style antitrust enforcement. A reason for that is again to
be sought in the fact that Competition Law is part of the Rome Treaty, the “Constitution”
of the EC. Therefore, the Commission reads article 86 in the light of the goals of the
Treaty rather than efficiency-oriented economic theory. 223
                                                          
222 See J. Neil Lombardo Resuscitating Monopoly Leveraging: Strategic Business Behavior and Its
Implications for the Proper Treatment of Unilateral Anticompetitive Conduct Under federal Antitrust Laws
41 St. Louis L. J. 387. Even though the article does not focus on international cases, it does provide a very
clear analysis of the long term effects of monopoly power as leveraged on non-monopolistic markets.
Essentially, the issue is one of business strategy and possibility to expand the possibility to reap benefits of
monopoly power from one market to another (something which is objected by mainstream antitrust
scholars, who believe that monopoly can only be exploited in one market).
223 See Thomas E. Kauper supra, note 217, 1682-1688.
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In this perspective, it appears understandable that, to US standards, the
Commission is (polemically) considered a determiner of fact instead of a trier of fact. 224
It is in fact argued that the Commission states a d does not bother to prove, that a certain
market is indeed a separate market. The Commission is often criticized for not providing
sufficient factual or methodological bases (on which one may present its counter-
arguments) and to completely disregard relevant economic data once it has drawn its
conclusions.
The one case that is still frequently referred to, as it illustrates most effectively
how the three troublesome aspects mentioned above affect the application of article 86 is
United Brands.225 The case regarded abusive conduct in the imports of bananas to Europe
by the well-known American corporation. To begin with, the Commission’s definition of
the relevant market (accepted by the Court of Justice) was characterized by the lack of
statistical and economic data that in the tradition of US antitrust must shape market
definition.
Geographically, the market was found to be determined by the absence of duties
and quotas which were in place in three Member States (the United Kingdom, Italy and
France). In short, the three Members were excluded from the relevant market because
imports were somehow publicly regulated and therefore subtracted from the free play of
competition.226 While such argument does not certainly appear to be ill founded in itself,
in strictly economic terms the fact that the remaining six Members were open to free
competition does not necessarily make all part of a unitary relevant market. Undeniably,
                                                          
224Jebsen and Stevens, supra, note 22, 463-466.
225 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European
Communities, [1978] E. C. R. 207.
226 “The effect of the national organization of these three markets is that the applicant’s  bananas do not
compete on equal terms with the other bananas sold in these States which benefit from a preferential system
and the Commission was right to exclude these three national markets from the geographic market”. Id., §
51.
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many other factors, like those based on consumer behavior in each Member State, or
specific costs that may vary from one area to another (relating to transportation, existing
retail facilities, advertising and marketing investments) could have shown that the six
Members were in fact too heterogeneous to be all part of the relevant market.
The definition of the product market (bananas, as opposed to fresh fruit generally)
was even more remarkably non-economically oriented and was later harshly criticized for
the emphasis the Court put on certain social goals of Competition Law, which are of
course totally absent in US antitrust standards. First, the Court heavily stressed certain
unique physical characteristics of bananas (appearance, taste, softness, seedle sness)227
which according to the US approach may be kept into account only if they are reflected
by some economically measurable appreciation (namely, substitutability) that is brought
before the court as evidence.
 Second, the Court coupled such characteristics with their attractiveness to a
determined, narrow group of consumers that, as a matter of general experience, were
deemed to find bananas particularly valuable and non-substitutable (the very young, the
old and the sick).228 As many commentators recognize, by so doing the Court
overemphasized the importance of so-called infra-marginal consumers, that is those
customers who are unlikely to shift to another product in spite of price increases, usually
because certain characteristics of the product in question make it the only suitable one.
Instead, it is widely thought that the Court should have considered marginal
consumers, that is the large group of individuals whose behavior is thought to be the
object of a monopolist’s business strategy in the sense that they can easily shift from one
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product to another, thereby protecting also infra-marginal consumers (who in themselves
are considered too much a narrow group for a firm to reap high profits).229
In economic terms, the Court should have ascertained whether there existed a
group of marginal consumers that, by shifting to a product other than Chiquita bananas,
could have punished United Brands’ pricing and distribution practices.230 From an
economically-oriented standpoint it would have been more accurate of the Court to hold
that the lack of cross elasticity with respect to other fresh fruit should have been tried in
connection with the large group of consumers that, not having particular needs, may react
to price increases by shifting to other seasonal produce.231 Critics object to the finding
that the arbitrarily asserted low degree of substitutability was the key factor to conclude
that bananas had specific features which influenced consumer choice.232
This part of the holding contributes to distinguish US antitrust and EC
competition law in a very vivid fashion. The first is oriented to the protection of
competition as such,233 which is considered capable to increase general welfare and
thereby help society as a whole benefit from technical and economic improvements. The
second, even considering the changes that are occurring (or to a bigger extent are
expected - sometimes skeptically - to occur) on account of the Commission Notice on
                                                          
229 Simon Baker and Lawrence Wu Applying the Market Definition Guidelines of the European
Commission [1998] E.C.L.R. 273, 276.
230 See Mark Furse Market Definition - The Draft Commission Notice [1997] E.C.L.R. 378, 380.
231 United Brands, § 28 “There is no significant long term cross-elasticity any more than - as has been
mentioned - there is any seasonal substitutability in general between the banana and all the seasonal fruits,
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232 Id., § 30.
233 From a different point of view, that of antitrust injury and recoverable damages, the Supreme Court held
in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc 429 U.S. 477 (1977) that antitrust legislation aims at
protecting competition. In this sense, in order for an antitrust violation to exist, it must be proved inter alia
that the contested practice diminished overall competitive conditions, which was well beyond the scope of
the Court of Justice’s holding in United Brands.
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market definition234 remains strongly attached to values that cannot be reduced to
economic efficiency.
The other part of United Brands that receives harsh criticism from US
commentators is that relating to the firm’s organization and commercial might. Many
read between the lines of the judgement and complain that under EC Competition Law it
is dominance in itself, no matter how legally obtained or employed, that is bound to be
punished.235 In United Brands neither the Commission nor the Court of Justice conducted
supply-side analysis to ascertain whether there was product substitutability, as the
Commission would be expected to do today in compliance with the guidelines it set forth
in the Notice.236 While demand-side substitutability (that is, the analysis in United Bra ds
reported here) is still to be considered as the most important factor in market definition
analysis, the Commission today recognizes that under certain circumstances supply-side
substitutability may have equivalent effects.237
However, to admit that Uni ed Brands was not decided with the  support of
supply-side analysis does not necessarily mean that the Court completely ignored that
aspect. Indeed, the Court’s language shows that it did (however indirectly, incompletely,
possibly improperly) compare United Brands’ potential with respect to that of other
producers of bananas. The Court considered United Brands’ structure on a global scale. It
                                                          
234 Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community Competition
Law O.J. 97(C) 372, 3. It is reminded that the Notice is not legislation in force.
235 Per Jebsen and Robert Stevens supra, note 22, 462.
236 The Commission’s step has been widely welcomed. See for instance Baker and Wu, supra note 231,
275. Others seem to maintain that in the end demand-side substitutability will remain the only decisive
criterion. See Kiran S. Desai The European Commission’s Draft Notice on Market Definition: A Brief
Guide to the Economics [1997] E.C.L.R. 473, 473.
237 O.J. 97(C) 372, 3 § 20. “Supply-side substitutability may also be taken into account when defining
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products and market them in the short term without incurring significant additional costs or risks in
response to small and permanent changes in relative prices.”
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started from its huge, unparalleled productive potential, deriving from its large
plantations of particularly resistant banana trees, which added to its privileged links with
independent producers (from which it was inferred that United Brands had managed to
insulate itself from any possible productive shortage, even in the face of natural
disasters). In short, at the production stage United Brands was able to “comply with all
the requests which it received”238 and so well organized that, despite any adverse
circumstances, it would have been unable to meet its clients’ needs.
The Court deemed worth including in the decision all the characteristics that made
United Brands a unique producer and distributor of bananas, which made it an
“undertaking integrated to a high degree”:239 growing expertise, transportation and
packaging facilities, successful scientific research, high yield, ripening techniques,
effective advertising campaigns.240 Needless to say, United Brands was highly efficient
and profitable on account of such perfected organization.
This point is exactly the conflict between US-style Antitrust and EC-style
Competition Law. “The EU authorities appear to regard factors that in the United States
would reflect nothing more than efficiency and success in enhancing consumer welfare as
necessarily indicating dominance.”241 It is not always easy not to fall into political if not
ideological considerations when dealing with similar issues, since there is not such thing
as an ultimate answer to whether a firm’s success will necessarily bring about enhanced
consumer welfare.
In fact, it could be effectively argued that even though the firm in question only
tries to maximize its own profits, it cannot do so without ipso facto providing better
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products or lower prices or both, thereby increasing general welfare. At the same time,
the policy of favoring smaller firms may be just as effective if distributive purposes are
accepted as a legitimate end of Competition Law. Also, big firms could be said to be
rightfully frowned upon because their size and dominance will help them exploit
consumers more effectively, so that the firms will not pass a fair share of production
improvements to the public. Stated differently, the reasoning could be stretched to mean
that too big a concentration of power in the hands of private businesses was not
welcomed in the community.
However, turning to legal arguments, there remains that even those who criticize
Communitarian institutions for their mindset and lament the Court’s inclination to blame
a firm for its success,242 must recognize that for the Court of Justice considering the
world-wide structure and productive potential of United Brands really meant finding that
the relevant market featured exceptionally high entry barriers. Only, in order for them to
be adequately evaluated, these barriers were to be sought (at least to a great extent)
outside the relevant market, outside the territory of those Members and, in short, outside
the Community.
The particular barriers to competitors entering the market are the
exceptionally large capital investments required for the creation and
running of banana plantations, the need to increase sources of supply in
order to avoid the effects of fruit diseases and bad weather (hurricanes,
floods), the introduction of an essential system of logistics which the
distribution of a very perishable product makes necessary, economies of
scale from which newcomers to the market cannot derive any immediate
benefit and the actual cost of entry made up inter alia of all the general
expenses incurred in penetrating the market such as the setting up of an
adequate commercial network, the mounting of very large-scale
                                                          
242 The paradox has been recognized for a long time. Among others, Judge Hand in Alcoa held that
“although the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the Act does not mean to condemn the
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competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.” Alcoa, 430.
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advertising campaigns, all those financial risks, the costs of which are
irrecoverable if the attempt fails.243
Right or wrong, the importance of concerns of financial availability could not be
more clear. The Court was worried that no other firm could ever find the funds necessary
to compete with United Brands, since of course having to operate a competing business
without the availability of the named structure and facilities was not a viable option.
United Brands had been in the business for about a century and had developed expertise
and experience. Also, United Brands had incurred the costs necessary to the achievement
of its state-of-the-art structure gradually, so that by the time of the contested violation it
was in the position to gather the benefits of investments that had been spread on a
considerable time span. Some commentators maintain that this is the underlying
reasoning of United Brands.244
The Court did not hesitate to hold that the firm, because of its own financial and
industrial power was in a comparatively advantageous position that did not allow other
producers to effectively compete.245 In order to compete, businesses should have
collected and invested money on a gigantic scale within a very short time, which was
deemed to be impossible or at least too unlikely for the Court to let the forces of the
market police any exploitative abuse. Or, other business should have tried to compete by
means of a less perfected organization, which would have exposed them to a variety of
possibly fatal risks. Within the EC, such sunk costs matter for the purposes of applying
Competition Law.246 In the particular case, United Brands was eventually not fined for
unfairly high pricing, as the Court reversed the Commission’s decision on the matter.
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Yet, the Court did nor rule out the possibility that United Brands or any other firm may
be held accountable for unfairly high prices in the presence of adequate evidence.247
This aspect of EC Competition Law is puzzling to US standards. One of the basic
tenets of mainstream US antitrust is that excessively high pricing is a counterproductive
practice in that it creates a chance for new competitors to enter the market and offer the
same commodity at lower yet fully profitable prices. In other words, it is maintained that
in the absence of barriers to entry - which from an economic standpoint are considered
very unlikely to exist - it will be a firm’s own interest not to attract entrants by charging
supracompetitive prices,  as that firm would be boun to lose customers to the new
competitors.
Yet, the Court plainly combined the “possibilities arising out of dominant
position” with price exploitation.248 In this criticized language249 it is plainly possible to
read the concern that a firm which does not have to fear new entrants can afford to reap
supracompetitive profits for a longtime. If in fact under US antitrust law it is not
excluded that a monopolist may reap such profits, it is  expected that within a reasonably
short time new entrants will punish such behavior. In this sense, the fact that within the
EC this concern is to some extent subtracted to the forces of competition and subjected to
the application of Competition Law is frowned upon by Americans.250
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In conclusion, it is interesting to note that the Court of Justice’s decision would
not be there had it not been for an orientation that  is the opposite of that the US Supreme
Court seemed to embrace in the part of the Matsus ita opinion discussed above. Neither
the Commission nor the Court of Justice purported to condemn United Brands for its
world-wide dominance in growing and distributing bananas. Doing so would have
implied a gross violation of jurisdictional principles to say the very least. Also,
conducting the necessary information-gathering would have been almost impossible. Yet,
the Communitarian institutions chose not to disregard the importance of United Brands’
organization, and refused to conclude that the implausibility of exerting prescriptive
jurisdiction should necessarily imply denying any legal relevance of factors that
eventually were thought to have had some effect on Europe.
The question that remains then is not whether the United Brands decision was in
fact correctly decided. For instance, probably today the case would have been to some
extent different from its very foundations, as the Commission would follow its own
guidelines concerning market definition, making it less unilateral. In fact, even though
the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice are by no means bound by those
guidelines, they are expected to reach a decision that is based on the allegations of the
parties.
Instead, the question is whether within the Community a change similar to that
mentioned above regarding the evolution of vertical restraints (which at least to some
extent approached the EC and the US) is taking place. The answer is of course complex.
Yet, it should not be forgotten that in recent years there have been new examples (such as
in Tetra Pak) of a mindset that remains different from that of US courts with respect to
dominant firms. Tetra Pak was condemned on charges of monopoly leveraging and tying.
Its absolutely dominant position in the market of aseptic carton containers for milk and
other liquid foods, acquired and reinforced by means of intellectual property rights over
processing machinery was fatal. In fact, the Court agreed with Court of First Instance,
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which was “correct in stating that the actual scope of the special responsibility imposed
on a dominant undertaking must be considered in the light of the specific circumstances
of each case which show a weakened competitive situation.” 251 Tetra Pak’s impressive
share of the market was found to justify the Court of First Instance’s non-orthodox
assessment of the relevant market. Quasi-monopolist firms (90-95% market share) that
occupy a leading position on distinct, though associated, markets (that of non-aseptic
containers in Tetra Pak) remain in a position similar to that of a dominant firm on these
markets as well. Tetra Pak’s conduct in the non-monopolized market was still subjected
to the special responsibility of the dominant firm without any need to show t at it
dominates the leveraged market,252 which could be said to correspond to the possibility
impose stricter standards on firms that ‘export’ dominance in one market to affect
another, competitive market..
The merger control regulation
Some of the difficulties in understanding the problems of market
definition and technical and economic progress seem to arise from a
misapprehension of the nature of competitive policy analysis. We are not
taking a snapshot of a market situation at a particular time. We are looking
at the dynamic development of a market and considering the short,
medium and long term impact of a given merger. In a time frame in which
foreseeable market developments are taken into account, it is perfectly
proper to consider wider market issues and the merger’s contribution to
technical and economic progress. It is in this context too that the recital to
the Community’s goal of social and economic cohesion must be
understood. Of course, we will seek to encourage economic development
in poorer areas of the community.253
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253 Leon Brittan The law and Policy of Merger Control in the EEC  1990 E.L.Rev. 351, 353.
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This statement shows very clearly that many of the considerations made and the
criticism reported under the discussion of article 86 could be repeated, at least in part,
with respect to Regulation 4064/89. Again, distributive, social and dynamic factors are
openly accepted as part of Competition Law enforcement.
In itself, the regulation was the fruit of an extremely lengthy debate which arose
out of the application of article 86 to a concentration that occurred when Continental Can
Corporation was found to have abused of its dominant position by acquiring its sole
competitor, thereby harming competition within the Community (the case was in part
analyzed under the discussion about the Economic Unit Theory, supra c apter II). Like in
United Brands and other similar cases, there was concern regarding Continental Can’s
financial might, which enabled it to achieve objectives that other firms could not afford to
pursue.254 This was challenged by the Commission as an article 86 violation. Even
though the Court of Justice eventually overruled the Commission’s decision (which had
fined Continental Can) for lack of evidence, it did uphold the reasoning that considered
abusive the structural change in competitive conditions obtained by means of superior
financial availability and overwhelming commercial might.
The difficulty with applying article 86 was clear since the beginning, as it is
obvious that a firm (like Continental Can) is liable to fall within the field of applicability
of article 86 only if it is already a dominant firm at the time of the acquisition of the
target. On its part, also article 85 was unsuitable with respect to a series of cases, since
concerted behavior (present in the Philip Morris case)255 - an absolute requirement for its
                                                          
254 See Jebsen and Stevens supra, note 22, 483-484.
255 British American Tobacco Ltd. and Reynolds Industries Inc. v. Commission [1987] E.C.R. 4487. In the
case the Court, reasoning on Philip Morris’ position as a minority shareholder, found that the possibility to
control a competitor by means of a shareholding relationship was a violation of article 85.
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application - might not necessarily be there every time a concentration is achieved:
primarily, not when a concentration derives from a hostile take-over bid.256
Apparently, any concentration whose implementation could have proved highly
anticompetitive would have been out of the reach of the Commission if carried out in the
form of a hostile take-over by a non-dominant firm. A similar scenario is a far cry from
being unrealistic: In 1999 one of the newborn telecommunication companies in Italy
acquired in a hostile fashion former State monopolist Telecom; remarkably, the size of
the target (one of the top five telecommunications companies in the world as for its size)
was estimated to be several times larger than that of the shark. Given the absence of
national merger control legislation within most of the Member States before the
enactment of regulation 4064/89, the difficulties arising from challenging anticompetitive
concentrations on the basis of sound legal bases are apparent.
Regulation 4064/89257 came to provide specific rules for concentrations, whether
these derive from mergers, acquisitions or concentrative (as opposed to cooperative) joint
ventures. In few words, concentrations that create or strengthen a dominant position are
incompatible with EC Competition Law, and subjected to the Commission’s review if
they meet certain threshold requirements.258 The ime elapsed from 1957 and the decades
of jurisprudential improvements to Competition Law contributed to its remarkable
internationally oriented character.
Especially today that all Member States have merger control legislation, the
Commission is expected to focus on the enforcement of large, transnational
concentrations. The difficulties that accompanied the extraterritorial  application of
articles 85 and 86 were resolved (or circumvented, to others) by simply providing ad hoc
                                                          
256 See Christopher S. Kerse and C.J. Cook E.C. Merger Control (2nd edition, 1996), 2-5.  See also Luigi
Ferrari Bravo and Enzo Moavero Milanesi supra, note 215, 352-355.
257 [1989] O.J.  L 395, 1.
258 Regulation 4064/89, article 2 § 3.
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jurisdictional requirements that leave no doubt concerning the possibility to apply the
regulation to fully non-European concentrations. As for the possibility to issue fines
against firms that do no have any contact to the EC (which of course poses enforceability
problems), under article 15 of regulation 17/62 the Commission could in fact fine
European firms that do business with condemned non-EC undertakings (that would
remain beyond the direct reach of the Commission). In the B eing case, this would have
meant that many of the world’s major airlines would have been fined had they done
business with Boeing.259 Of course, while this remains true on a merely legal plane, it is
not to say that criticism to the broad scope of the regulation is absolutely unfounded: The
conflicts between purely objective, certainly aggressive jurisdictional criteria and
international law discussed in chapter II are even more troublesome in the field of
concentrations because of their increased frequency and strategic importance.260
The study of the Boeing - McDonnell Douglas (MDC)  case (Boeing) is
particularly fitting to this thesis in that (i) both companies were American; (i ) they did
not have assets or subsidiaries within the Community, which highlights the complete
unimportance of territoriality for the purposes of merger regulation; (iii) the relevant
geographic market was found to be the entire world,261 which of course maximizes the
implications deriving from taking into account all possible factors that are liable to
somehow affect competition within the Community in spite of the location of competitors
and/or customers; (iv)many sovereign priorities were at issue, since the case involved the
highly strategic aerospace industry and even sensitive (military) research, which caused
                                                          
259 Regulation 17/62, article 15.
260 See Andre R. Fiebig International Law Limits on the Extraterritorial Application of the European
Merger Control Regulation and Suggestion for Reform [1998] E.C.L.R. 323, 325-327.
261 Commission Decision of July 30, 1997. O.J. L 336, 16 § 20 “Large commercial jet aircraft are sold and
operated throughout the world under similar conditions of competition. Relative transportation costs of
delivery are negligible. Therefore, the Commission considers that the geographic market for large
commercial jet aircraft to be taken into account is a world market.”
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the highest political authorities to take part in the dispute. Not surprisingly, the US/EC
cooperation agreement, which as discussed above requires each party to consider the
other’s interests, was found to be futile by some commentators.262 Th  disagreement
between the Federal Trade Commission (which authorized the merger) and the European
Commission was deeply rooted. “While the FTC looked to McDonnell Douglas
competitive significance, the EC focused on whether the merger would strengthen
Boeing’s dominant position. US courts likely would not have recognized the EC theories,
and the reverse may be true as well”.263 combined with the tense political environment
that accompanied the negotiations surrounding the merger might be one of the reasons
which caused the US and the EC to exclude merger control when they enhanced the
positive comity clause in 1998 (even though the legal argument for doing so rested on
scarce procedural compatibility).
From the standpoint of the language of the merger regulation, there is no doubt
that the Commission rightfully exerted jurisdiction over Boeing and MDC precisely on
account of their agreement: “it was clear that as a matter of EC law, there would be
jurisdiction over the transaction.”264 The regulation in fact supersedes the results of the
debate about jurisdiction examined above by introducing a new  jurisdictional basis, that
is the Community dimension.265
As far as global transactions such as that in Boeing are concerned, employing
purely numeric criteria such as that aggregated world-wide and Community-wide
turnover provides an objective basis, which can only be disputed to the extent that
                                                          
262 Amy Ann Karpel The European Commission’s Decision on the Boeing - McDonnell Douglas Merger
and the Need for Greater US - EC Cooperation in the Merger Field 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 1029, 1034.
263 Nina L Hachigian An overview: International Antitrust Enforcement 12-FALL Antitrust 22, 25.
264 Joseph P. Griffin Antitrust Aspects of Cross-Borders Mergers and Acquisitions [1998] E.C.L.R. 12, 16.
265 Pursuant to article 1, the regulation “shall apply to hall concentrations having a Community dimension”,
which is on its turn defined on the basis of the thresholds set forth in the following section of article 1.
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difficulties arise with respect to the monetary determination of the turnover.266 As it
appears, nothing else but the simple conclusion of the agreement between parties whose
turnover exceed the thresholds of article 1 has relevance, as it was the case in Boeing.267
Nationality, place of business, presence of assets and/or subsidiaries or unincorporated
establishments of either Boeing or MDC were immaterial, proving once more that “the
regulation is essentially unlimited in its territorial scope.”268
On account of such legal requirements, it was virtually impossible for the parties
to object to the Commission’s jurisdiction. In fact, the regulation’s requirement that at
least one of the parties have substantial operations within the Community only appears in
the recitals. It has been correctly argued that, had the requirement found place within the
prescriptive part of the regulation, the Boeing case would not be there.269
Interestingly, the regulation’s thresholds are often said to have been founded on
the effects doctrine / implementation approach (the effects in question being the turnover
of the merging firms as allocated within a specific territory).270 It foll ws that once the
threshold requirements are satisfied, a non-rebuttable presumption operates in the sense
of concluding that the merger at issue is being implemented within the Community
regardless of other territorial factors: “The real source of expansive authority derives
from the definition of Community dimension.”271
                                                          
266 See C.S. Kerse and C.J. Cook, supra note 258, 66-68.
267 See Antonio F. Bavasso Boeing/McDonnell Douglas: Did the Commission Fly Too High? [1998]
E.C.L.R. 243, 245.
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In the absence of an explicit decision of the European judiciary most
commentators maintain that the principles set forth in Wood Pulpmust apply to all
sectors of EC Competition Law, including the merger regulation.272 Only, unlike articles
85-86 or §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the merger control regulation (like § 7 of the
Clayton Act) is triggered when mergers are still incipient. Technically, the antitrust
violation is yet to take place (in fact, it is a violation not to notify the Commission of the
proposed or concluded deal). Based as they are on the past turnover of the merging firms,
the effects on competition are both potential and merely anticipated.273
Because the assessment of the effects takes place prior to their actual unfolding
and is precisely aimed at controlling the way they unfold once the concentration has
occurred, there is a trilateral relation encompassing the assessment of anticomp ti ive
effects, the exertion of jurisdiction and the substantive application of the regulation (that
is, the scope of the conditions that the Commission will try to impose on the merging
parties). Some commentators do not overemphasize the possibility of conflicts that arise
out of this construction. While they concede that a case such as Boeing is peculiar for its
“blatant foreignness”, they acknowledge the authority of enforcement agencies to reach
anticompetitive activities that harm competition and consumers on their territory in spite
of the location of the assets or nationality. 274
 Others argue that the regulation’s language concerning the Community threshold,
coupled with the attitude the Commission maintained in Boeing, really serve like a
springboard to impose “remedies wholly unrelated to a merger and targeted at
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transactions without effects or implementation within the EU.” 275  In other words, the
far-reaching jurisdictional scope of regulation 4064/89 is said to have proved a powerful
instrument to exploit the pre-merger notification requirement and impose conditions that
favor so called European champions (namely, Airbus).276In thi  sense, asserting
jurisdiction on a formally legal basis would be worthless, especially in the light of the
extremely narrow time frame that is peculiar of concentration transactions (which implies
that the Commission can effectively condition its assent to the concentration without the
Court’s review).277
One could concede that, despite Commission’s officials statements to the
contrary, the fate of Airbus was indeed a concern. Yet, the question  remains of whether
ensuring that Airbus would not be completely annihilated by the merger was in fact a
protectionist, chauvinist move or an attempt to protect the manufacturers’ clients (the
airlines) and ultimately the passengers at large. In other words, while critics maintain that
the Commission at best protected Boeing’s only competitor (which would be against the
assumption that antitrust must police competition, not defend competitors), others justify
the Commission’s fear that Boeing may behave predatorily in the future.
While the Federal Trade Commission found that MDC was no more a competitive
force due to the lack of research and investments, the Commission found that its presence
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in the aerospace industry affected a market whose peculiarity consists of the fact that
manufacturers bid to conclude supply contracts. In this sense, it had been observed that
both Airbus and Boeing had to bid lower prices to obtain a supply contract whenever they
knew that MDC would present its offer as well, which of course meant lower prices for
the supply. In the main, airlines reported that the influence of MDC was of “major” or or
“significant importance.”278
That the presence of more bidders increased price competition was confirmed by a
specific study, which found that downward pressure on prices brought about by MDC’s
bidding averaged 7%.279 Also, both agencies recognized that the aerospace industry is
unlikely to be characterized by new entrants in the foreseeable future (as the fact that the
only entrant of the past decades was Airbus, a publicly-sponsored consortium supported
by four governments, indirectly confirms). Boeing recognized that there are “massive
barriers to entry”, due to huge initial development and investment costs, safety
regulations, sunk costs. 280
One - if not the - most debated issue was the existence of exclusivity long term
contracts between Boeing and the three biggest airlines of the world. Such contracts had
actually been concluded before the proposed merger; since all parties to those deals were
American companies, many suspected that the Commission exploited the merger to reach
conduct that could have had article 86 relevance had not those deals been out of the scope
of the implementation doctrine. As a matter of fact, much of the Commission’s final
decision concerned Boeing’s individual dominance, based on its presence in all the
segments of the aircraft market, its completely unchallenged presence in the top segment
                                                          
278 “Although, as outlined above, the market share of MDC has been continuously declining, it appears that
the impact of MDC on the conditions of competition in the market for large commercial aircraft was higher
than reflected by its market share in 1996.” Boeing, § 58 (emphasis added).
279 Id.
280 Id., § 49.
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(that of the 747s), and the fact that almost two thirds of the fleet in service were Boeing
aircraft (which implies a much higher chance of maintaining those customers).281
Based on those criteria (especially as set forth in paragraphs 38-41, dealing with
the importance of supplying “families” of aircraft and with the influence of the fleet in
service over new purchases), the Commission found that Boeing’s dominance was bound
to increase because by merging with MCD Boeing would have acquired a quasi-
monopolistic share of the fleet in service, thereby in all likelihood securing itself a quasi-
monopolistic hold of the growing future market.
This strengthening was found to be unacceptable, especially in the light of the fact
that there appeared to be limits to new competitor’s ability to open inroads into Boeing’s
market share in spite of lower prices and other contractual conditions. In other words, the
nature of the aircraft market is such that airlines were highly inclined to maintain a loyal
attitude to a given supplier. The Commission reasoned that the only competitor’s
persistent difficulty in opening inroads in the biggest airlines’ fleets was bound to
increase if Boeing could add to its dominance MDC’s strength on the market and the
defense contracts that both companies had (which implies publicly funded research).
The Commission in fact acknowledged that MDC’s presence on the market, in
spite of its positive effect on price competition, was bound to end soon and that it was
becoming increasingly unlikely that any other firm would acquire it.282 Yet, th  potential
for an anticompetitive concentration was found to rest on the fact that it was the dominant
Boeing that was merging with MDC. Intellectual property, defense contracts, buying
power added to their respective market share in the civil aircraft market. The Commission
required inter alia that the two entities continue to exist as independent entities, that
Boeing relinquish enforcement of the exclusivity deals and do not conclude similar
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agreements for ten years, that it do not leverage MDC’s market share to force
replacement of existing MDC aircraft with Boeing’s and that it do not leverage its buying
power to keep suppliers to provide Airbus equipment and parts.283
Leaving aside the dispute of whether the Commission’s conclusions were
arbitrary, it should be noted that the decision considered both the airlines’ need to have
more bidders to keep price competition higher and Airbus’ need to find suppliers for
parts. Going back to the relation between the exertion of jurisdiction and the substantive
application of the regulation, it appears that unlike US authorities “the Commission has
evaluated effects on competition as encompassing effects on both direct customers and
competitors”.284 Unquestionably, this is considerably different from the cited US policy
of protecting competition, not competitors. Even though the conclusion seems ‘suspect’,
since the only competitor to be protected happened to be Airbus, it is reminded that
Boeing was by no means unique in this (see the discussion under article 86 supr ).
Leaving charges of protectionism aside, it must be noted that the Commission’s approach
has ramifications on the scope of its jurisdiction: The broadening of the range of interests
that need to be evaluated and safeguarded results in a “broader basis for jurisdiction or,
conversely, a narrower scope for restraint”.285
Before concluding it should be noted that only one month prior to the Boeing
decision the Council had enacted a regulation partially amending the merger control
regulation, effective on March 1998.286 The amendment concerned the broadening of the
notion of concentrative joint venture and the redefinition Community dimension
criterion. Neither amendment would have affected Boeing in any fashion. The
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Commission’s proposal (refused by the Council) aimed at allowing it to exert jurisdiction
on virtually any transnational concentration regardless of turnover thresholds.
The Council however agreed to afford the Commission a broader jurisdictional
basis. While the effects of the amendment largely affect the relationship between the
Commission and the antitrust authorities of the single Member States (that is, the
amendment regards more directly subsidiariety than extraterritoriality), it suggests that
the Community is determined to aggressively bring transnational concentrations under its
control to the greatest extent possible.287
In comparison with the original text of the regulation, the more active role of the
Commission is also reflected by the formalization of the power to negotiate the
conditions for the conclusion of the merger during the very first stage of the procedure
(something that already happened in practice) and to declare the concentration
compatible with the common market at the end of that first exam.288 Likewise, while the
concentration is suspended until it is declared compatible, 289  the Commission now has
broader discretion in allowing waivers to the suspension (since the waiver does not have
to depend on the detriment deriving from the suspension to the interested parties), which
may well enhance the Commission’s negotiating power.290
                                                          
287 See Francesco Stella Attuali Tendenze della Normativa Comunitaria e Nazionale in Tema di
Concorrenza (1997).
288 Regulation 4064/89, article 8.
289 Regulation 4064/89, article 7.
290 Regulation 4064/89 article 7 § 4.
98
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, it must be preliminarily confirmed that, as assumed, no
discriminatory standards exist in the application of EC Competition Law. No one of the
cases that have been examined contained language or reasoning suggesting that, albeit in
some unspoken way, the EC willingly disfavors firms that are based outside the EC and
possibly compete with EC undertakings. However, it cannot be omitted that not all
commentators agree that this holds true in the Bo ing case, which many regard as a clear
example of protectionism of a “national champion”.
Of the first of the two main issues that were examined, the way the EC exerts
jurisdiction with respect to extra-Communitarian entities, the peculiarities of the
“European way” and the results this provides were discussed in chapter two. With
particular regard to the application of EC law to US firms, the existence of the EC/US
agreement was found to be a plus for legal entities of the two sides of the Atlantic. The
aspect that appears to be unprecedented about the EC/US agreement is the possibility for
private businesses to make strategic choices once they have been caught by enforcement
agencies and evaluate whether it is preferable to consent to a limitation of their rights in
the light of the chance to negotiate, at least to some extent,  the legal consequences of the
violation at issue.
It appears that, at least to some extent, transnational firms will be in a much more
active position while dealing with the Commission. It is not surprising then that at the
time of the Boeing case business newspapers were filled with reports concerning the
ongoing negotiation between the Commission and Boeing officials. In spite of the
outcome in that particular case, the indication is clear that for the future major
transnational businesses may elect to discuss certain proposed transactions with the
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Commission prior to their implementation. In practice, this will mainly concern mergers
and acquisitions on account of the fact that merger statutes, unlike those prohibiting
anticompetitive agreements or abuses of dominant position (monopolization and the like
within the US), are ‘incipiency statutes’, focused as they are on events yet to happen.
As far as the case-oriented analysis that has been carried out is concerned, the
conclusions are somewhat less obvious. To hold that non-EC firms are or will typically
be treated in a certain way only because this has happened at least once in a given case
would be arbitrary and in all likelihood plainly wrong. If the raison d’êtreof Competition
Law is protecting the market, it cannot make a difference whether the firms that affect it
are based within the EC or not.
All along chapter three there are references to the highly biased character of EC
law. It is said to be characterized by clearly regulatory purposes that go well beyond the
goal of policing the competitive conditions of a market. This of course does not concern
transnational businesses only. Yet, the premises and the political will to grant the
Commission specially intrusive powers are there and, particularly today that the Member
States have national antitrust authorities, they hint at some kind of reshaping of the
Commission’s role.
As explained in chapter three, often the Commission will in fact intervene in cases
that have a particularly evident transnational character, as opposed to those whose
anticompetitive consequences are more likely to be perceived within one Member State
(or more than one, as long as it remains a “local” case). If anything at all can be said
about the application of EC Competition Law to transnational businesses, it would be
probably safe to note that the Commission has been showing more interest in them. This
is likely to be due to the ever-increasing international commerce and to the fact that at
least one of the most important (and peculiar) goals of EC-style antitrust is now an
achievement rather than an objective: market integration.
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The Commission’s special attention to large transnational firms is confirmed by
its willingness to entertain in-depth relationships with them. As noted under the relevant
section, this was institutionalized in the case of the merger regulation, which currently
covers the bulk of all the transatlantic relations that concern Competition Law.
Unquestionably, by doing so no discriminatorily special treatment was reserved to larger
undertakings. At the same time, the fact that their size (and that of their turnover) matters,
which it would be unreasonable to ignore, has been given proper acknowledgement.
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